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The growth of payday lending markets during the last fifteen years has been the
focus of substantial regulatory attention both in the United States and abroad,
producing a dizzying array of initiatives by federal and state policymakers. Those
initiatives have had conflicting purposes—some have sought to remove barriers to
entry while others have sought to impose limits on the business. As is often the case
in banking markets, the resulting patchwork of federal and state laws poses a problem
when one state is able to dictate the practices of a national industry. For most of
this industry’s life, just that has happened—the ability of lenders to take advantage
of the laws of the least restrictive states has effectively displaced the laws of more
restrictive states. Recently, however, significant changes in the policies of federal
regulators have limited the ability of lenders to “export” less restrictive laws. Now,
states can effectively police payday lenders within their borders for the first time.
Yet as we enter an era in which states will be able to regulate payday lending
more effectively, there has been little clear analysis regarding how they should do
so. This Article provides a detailed explanation of the business models and regulatory
regimes that exist today, together with a framework of options designed to implement
various perspectives regulators might adopt. We emphasize three main points.
The first is the unusual nature of payday lending, with very high interest rates
accruing against necessarily limited-debt amounts. Unlike other consumer-lending
products such as credit cards, the payday loan amount does not increase over time, but
the repetitive short-term interest obligation can lead to a recurring-cash annuity for
*
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the lender. Second, we underscore the limitations of existing legal regimes, which
often leave loopholes that permit lenders to avoid the statutory framework; this is a
particularly serious problem for the majority of states that have tried to limit rollover
lending. Third, addressing the majority of jurisdictions that have not banned payday
lending, we advocate a reversal of the current hostility to market activity by large
institutions. If the market is to exist, we believe it is better for it to be populated by
highly visible national providers than by smaller mom-and-pop providers.
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INTRODUCTION

Regulating lenders that offer credit to consumers with impaired credit
histories is a tricky business. Consumers want access to credit, lenders want to
charge high interest rates to offset relatively high transaction costs and loss ratios,
and policy analysts and lawmakers want to protect consumers from foolish
behavior, high interest rates, and abusive practices. The spirit of the market is
captured by a recent Cash America television advertisement advising that “some
things can’t wait until payday.”1 In the current market, banks generally refuse to
make the short-term, risky loans many of these consumers seek, but fringe-credit
providers have risen up in their place, at least some of which engage in deceptive
and abusive practices that violate existing law. As the market grows, it becomes
ever clearer that the existing regulatory framework is inadequate.
This Article provides a careful look at the difficulties of regulating the
most prominent and rapidly growing of these fringe providers—payday lenders.
Payday lenders offer short-term loans at high interest rates to consumers with
impaired credit histories. In a typical transaction, a customer writes a check to
the payday lender for a relatively small sum, such as $230, dating the check
for the date of the customer’s next paycheck. In exchange, the payday lender
gives the customer $200 in cash immediately. On the date of the customer’s
paycheck, the payday lender collects its loan by depositing the postdated
check. The duration, amount, and fee all can differ from provider to provider,
but as a general rule, the loans are small, the repayment period is short, and the
annualized interest rate is high. In this example, with a fee of $30 for a two-week
loan of $200, the annual interest rate is almost 400 percent.
The high interest rates that payday lenders charge have generated a flurry of
critical proposals, ranging from calls to end payday lending altogether to proposals for additional disclosures by payday lenders.2 The existing academic
1.
Cash America Television Advertisement (Sept. 7, 2006).
2.
See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004); Richard R.W.
Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006); Carmen M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park,
Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility Save Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 119
(2005); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002);
Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. the Rent-to-Own Industry: Reaching a
Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385 (1997); Therese Wilson, The Inadequacy of the Current
Regulatory Response to Payday Lending, 32 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 193, 198–206 (2004); Michael Bertics,
Note, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133 (2005);
Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and
Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2001); Diane Hellwig,
Comment, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market
Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2005); Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note, Modern Day Loan
Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725 (2000).
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literature, however, lacks a frank assessment of the complex regulatory problems
that payday lending presents. Scholars calling for intrusive regulation or outright
prohibition of payday lending have skipped over the necessary step of explaining
precisely what it is about this market that is so offensive as to justify prohibition
or regulation. High interest rates standing alone are not a sufficient basis for regulatory intervention. Furthermore, such criticism has failed to explain how the
elimination of payday lending would protect consumers who would then be drawn
to other, even riskier sources of cash. Thus, our starting point is that a sensible
scheme of regulation must rest on a determination that the transactions involve
market failures, that the payday lending industry externalizes costs to the rest of
society, or that the transactions offend social norms or justice in some other way.3
Regulation also cannot proceed sensibly without a rich understanding of the
economics of the market, including information about the business model and
the competitive structure of the industry. Most of the existing literature focuses
on a single feature of the product—the high price—without considering the
product’s business and regulatory context. Accordingly, in Part I, we attempt to
craft a realistic assessment of the business model, competitive structure, and
regulatory environment of the existing industry. We draw on existing empirical
studies, government reports, as well as our own conversations with regulators
and industry participants. As Part I explains, we write at a crucial and unusual
moment in the regulatory history of consumer finance. Though the typical
pattern for the last half century has been for federal preemption to expand
consistently to prevent effective state regulation4—exemplified by regulation
targeting credit card and subprime mortgage lending—the last few years have
witnessed an unparalleled determination by federal regulators to withdraw from
the field, leaving the way open for effective state regulation.

3.
So, for example, discussions often focus on the concern that payday lenders might target insular
groups, such as minorities, immigrants, or military service people. Payday borrowing by the military has
been a hot topic since an August 2006 Department of Defense report estimated that as many as 17 percent
of military personnel use payday loans. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING
PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 17 (Aug. 9,
2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf. Many military personnel,
particularly the young, are persistently cash poor. Yet, they are unlikely to be laid off or to receive
their payroll checks late or have them dishonored. So, it is not surprising that check-cashing stores, and
the payday lending stores that have grown out of them, often appear near military bases. Moreover, the
unstable location of military families makes them more likely to rent and less likely to own homes than
similarly situated civilian families. Because the credit-reporting system disadvantages those who do not
own homes, military families have a harder time gaining access to mainstream intermediate and
long-term credit products, making short-term payday loans relatively more attractive.
4.
For a lucid and comprehensive discussion, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, EverExpanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).
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Responding to that opportunity, Part II analyzes three distinct policy
perspectives that individual states might endorse, matched with regulatory
schemes that implement those perspectives. Recognizing that no jurisdiction in
the United States has adopted a completely laissez-faire approach to the payday
lending industry, the three perspectives that we consider lie along a spectrum
from total prohibition, to a limited prohibition of indefinite rollover loans, to
moderately restrictive licensing requirements.
We first consider whether payday lending should be tolerated at all. To the
extent that the payday lending market is inevitably connected with consumer
deception and financial distress, we can make out a case for complete prohibition. If consumers use the product because they do not understand the distress
into which it can lead them, then it would be plausible to ban the product either
on paternalistic grounds or to limit the broader social costs of their financial
distress. For us, the strongest counterargument is that the prohibition of payday
lending would only lead to a shift of lending activity—borrowers will continue to
borrow but will do so using products that are more harmful than payday loans.
But many empirical questions remain unanswered, especially about the
interaction among fringe-credit products5 and about the borrower side of this
6
market. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the societal effect of payday lending.
5.
For example, we know little about whether payday loans facilitate or substitute for other borrowing. Although the United Kingdom has produced an interesting report explaining how the various
products work, where they are used, and what has happened when jurisdictions have tried to ban particular
products, it remains unclear how alternative borrowing products interact with each other and which products
are used by which sectors of the middle- and low-income populations. See UNITED KINGDOM DEP’T OF
TRADE & INDUS., THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE CONTROLS IN OTHER COUNTRIES (2004) [hereinafter
DTI REPORT], http://microfinancegateway.com/files/25620_file_The_effect_of_interest_rate_controls.pdf.
In other words, if we knew that borrowers frequently used payday loans to pay the minimum balances
on their credit cards or to recover pawned goods, we might have different concerns than if we thought
that these products did not interact.
6.
There is little information about the most common uses of the borrowed funds, and, in
particular, whether there is reason to believe they encourage spending. The best studies of which we
are aware suggest that the great majority of funds are not used for immediate consumption. For
example, a study by Gregory Elliehausen and Edward Lawrence concludes that 65 percent of borrowers
use the funds for “emergencies,” 11 percent for “planned expenses,” and 22 percent for “other.”
Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance Credit in America: An Analysis of
Customer Demand 47 (April 2001) (Monograph #35, Credit Research Ctr., McDonough Sch. of
Bus., Georgetown Univ.), http://www.cfsa.net/mediares/Reports/GeorgetownStudy.pdf. Similarly,
a study conducted by Environics Research Group on behalf of the Canadian Association of Community
Financial Service Providers reports that 92 percent of payday customers ascribe their use of the product to
an immediate cash-flow crisis and 4 percent to immediate consumption. Environics Research Group,
Understanding Consumers of Canada’s Payday Loans Industry 18 (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/reports/PaydayLoansReportPresentationJune9.ppt. Also, studies have
reached differing conclusions about the demographics of payday borrowers. For example, industryfunded studies suggest that the customer base is relatively well-off. See id. at 5 (suggesting that payday
loan users in Canada are about as likely to have incomes above $60,000 as below $40,000); see also
National Endowment for Financial Education, The Debt Cycle: Using Payday Loans to Make Ends

860

54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 855 (2007)

In any event, states that decide that an outright ban is best can eliminate
this product if they have the political will to do so. Drawing on the experience of
New York, we argue that the key is a hard and fast usury limit, coupled with
vigilant enforcement against efforts to import rates from other states. As we
explain in Subpart I.C, recent actions of federal banking regulators have limited
the ability of banks to force states to permit the importation of out-of-state interest rates. Thus, states for the first time have a realistic option of excluding
payday lenders from their borders.
The second possibility is to ban indefinite rollover loans—transactions in
which payday customers borrow repetitively instead of repaying their loans. We
develop the reasons why indefinite rollover loans might—or might not—trouble
thoughtful regulators. In turn, we discuss initiatives necessary to ban these loans
effectively. Although many states have adopted legislation purporting to curb
rollovers, few, if any, states have enacted legislation that will be successful in
that respect. Accordingly, we argue that legislatures should combine a statewide
database of all licensed lending transactions with a rule that bans not only
immediate rollover transactions but also requires a substantial cooling-off period
between transactions.
Finally, we offer a comprehensive set of proposals for jurisdictions that wish
to allow licensed lenders to operate within their borders but also want to police
abuses. These proposals proceed on two fronts. The first is a microfront, designed
to make the product more transparent so that customers can easily and reliably
understand the charges they will pay if they use the product. We would retain
the licensing regimes that are common in most jurisdictions, but we would add
two new initiatives. First, we would ban the sales of associated products, like
insurance or membership fees, that increase the cost of credit but are not readily
reflected in the price given to customers. Second, we would abandon the misguided Truth In Lending Act disclosure regime7 in favor of a simpler, more

Meet 9 (undated summary of Feb. 2002 panel discussion) [hereinafter NEFE White Paper], available at
http://www.nefe.org/pages/whitepaperpaydayloans.html (suggesting that customers typically have incomes
between $25,000 and $50,000). On the other hand, at least some independent studies present starker data.
See id. at 9–10 (suggesting a median income of $23,690 in Chicago payday loan customers). The most that
can be said with certainty is that payday lending customers are sufficiently well-off to have bank accounts.
Finally, despite pathbreaking studies of consumer bankruptcy, there is little research about the role of fringe
products in the finances of the financially distressed. For some evidence on that question, see Robert
Mayer, One Payday, Many Payday Loans: Short-Term Lending Abuse in Milwaukee County (Loyola Univ.
Chi., Working Paper, undated), available at http://www.luc.edu/depts/polisci/research/mayer21.pdf.
7.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667. Many stores compete on the basis of this fee and advertise the information so that it is available even before the borrower enters the store. However, to the extent the
products involve hidden fees, a well-crafted disclosure requirement would focus competition on price
and service.
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comprehensible, and more relevant disclosure of the dollar amount of the fee,
stated as a percentage of the loan amount and presented early in the transaction.
The second part of our approach is a macrofront, designed to increase
participation in the market by large national providers. The reputational
constraints and regulatory supervision of large companies make it easier to identify
and eradicate illegal or deceptive practices of those companies. In the current
environment, regulators’ perspectives on large national providers range from
skepticism to hostility, and the largest and most responsible financial institutions
are discouraged from participating in this market. The markets are left to entities
that are, by definition, less responsible. If local governments want to permit
payday lending, then it is important to ensure the involvement of lenders with
reputational interests at stake. It is much less clear that banks have any special
role in this market because the competencies that cause the large national
providers to excel are not necessarily attributes associated with depository
institutions. Moreover, the participation of banks in this market could frustrate
the efforts of states to implement reasonable regulatory schemes. Still, if banks
can in fact compete prudently with the large national providers on an equal
footing (that is, without avoiding state regulatory authorities), then they should
be encouraged to enter.

I.

THE BUSINESS AND THE LAW OF PAYDAY LENDING

A. The Economics of Payday Lending
Payday lending is a significant industry in the United States and it is
8
growing. In 2003, payday lenders advanced somewhere between $25 billion and
9
$40 billion, and from 2000 to 2004, analysts estimate that the number of payday
lending stores increased from 10,000 to 22,00010—up from around just 200 at the
11
start of the 1990s. In the next ten years, the number of stores is expected to
12
double, though the growth of Internet lending might slow the pace of new-store
growth. To understand how this growing industry should be regulated, the first
thing to understand is the product.
In financial terms, the product is a very short-term, single-payment loan,
in which the lender extends a loan on one date, in return for a promise (usually
8.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.
9.
Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 1 (FDIC
Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf.
10.
Id.
11.
JOHN P. CASKEY, THE ECONOMICS OF PAYDAY LENDING 3 (2002).
12.
First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 16, 2005).
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evidenced by a postdated check13 or by automated clearinghouse (ACH)14
authorization) to repay the amount of the loan plus a standard fee, typically
in the range of $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed.15 Notably, the amount of the
fee is usually fixed, without regard to the number of days that will elapse
between the date of the loan and the fixed repayment date, which is normally
the expected date of the borrower’s next paycheck.16
Historically, the payday loan developed from the check-cashing business
as a variant in which the cashier advances a lower amount in return for its
agreement to defer presentment of the check.17 One executive explained the
source of the product as follows:
We have been in the check-cashing business since 1983. Payday loans
grew out of that business in the early 1990’s. We would cash a personal
check on the weekend for 10% of the check, but most payroll checks or
government checks we would cash for 3%. So people would come to us
on Thursday and ask if we would cash it then and hold it until Monday.
For a while we said no we wouldn’t do that, then we started trying it out,
found there was a demand for cashing post-dated checks, and slowly
gravitated into that, charging an extra 5% or so for the extra risk and
service. People loved it. Their options, when they are in a bind, are that
they can write a check that will go on insufficient funds, but they’ll get a
charge of $35/check. So if they write three checks for $100 they will get
$105 in fees, which is a pretty bad alternative. Or they can accept the
late-rent penalty. Or they can put off fixing their car and lose two or three
18
days of work.

To assess the creditworthiness of the borrower, the typical lender (at least if
it is one of the major chains discussed in the next Subpart) will collect a few
13.
Advance America, Cash Advance Centers is an example of an operation that only permits
customers to obtain payday loans through personal checks. Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 31, 2005).
14.
In the automated clearinghouse (ACH) system, direct debits are commonplace. See generally
RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 177–97 (3d ed. 2006).
15.
See, e.g., First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12, at 5 (“Fees charged for short-term advances
are generally regulated by state law and range from 13.9% to 40% of the amount advanced per
transaction.”); QC Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 31, 2005) (“[A] fee . . . generally
ranges between $15 to $20 per $100 borrowed.”). For a survey of different fees calculated as annual
percentage rates, see Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The
Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 661 (2005).
16.
Community Financial Services Association of America, What Is Payday Advance?,
http://www.cfsa.net/mediares/bmediares.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). See also infra note 246 and
accompanying text for our discussion of the relation between this aspect of the rate structure and a
sensible disclosure scheme.
17.
See Paul Chessin, Borrowing From Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado’s
Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U.L. REV. 387, 393 (2005).
18.
Interview with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
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pieces of information about the borrower, including proof of identification,
evidence of income, and a current bank statement.19 The store will evaluate past
borrowing history and those criteria using a software program, functionally
parallel to the credit scoring that credit card issuers use to evaluate their
customers.20 In some cases, though certainly not all, the data might be checked
against a database with information about prior behavior available from a
company like TeleTrack.21 If the loan is approved,22 the funds are advanced
23
immediately. If the loan goes into default, it is difficult to generalize about
collection processes, which plainly vary. For the large providers, however, collection efforts typically stop short of litigation, largely because of the small amounts
at stake and the limited likelihood of enforcing a judgment against a defaulting
payday loan customer.24
The industry depends heavily on retail-store locations, generally
because of the sense that many customers will travel only to the store that is
nearest their place of employment. As described in an Federal Deposit
19.
See generally Charles Gerena, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Need Quick Cash?, REGION
FOCUS (Summer 2002), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/
region_focus/summer_2002/feature3.cfm. For specific lenders describing their own requirements, see
Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc., supra note 13, at 4 (noting that customers usually must have
“proof of identification, a pay stub or other evidence of income, and bank statement”); First Cash Fin.
Servs., Inc., supra note at 12, at 5 (“To qualify for a short-term advance, customers generally must have
proof of steady income, a checking account with a minimum of returned items within a specified period,
and valid identification.”); QC Holdings, Inc., supra note 15, at 3 (“To obtain a payday loan from us,
a customer must complete a loan application, maintain a personal checking account, have a source of
income, and not otherwise be in default on a loan from us.”).
20.
E.g., ACE Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (Sept. 12, 2005) (“For the
short-term consumer loans we offer, the customer’s application data is electronically transmitted to our
centralized computer system, which scores the loan with a proprietary loan-scoring system. An approval
or denial is communicated back to the store, where the required loan documentation or adverse action
form is printed for the customer.”); First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12, at 5 (“Computer operating
systems in the Company’s payday advance stores allow a store manager or clerk to recall rapidly
customer check cashing histories, short-term advance histories, and other vital information.”).
21.
The industry sources to whom we have spoken suggest that they do not use sources like
TeleTrack regularly because its data are so spotty that it is not often useful. One explained that it
only lowers the rate of default by about 25 percent. Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file
with authors).
22.
We have not found any public information about denial rates, but interviews with industry
sources suggest that approval rates are quite high (in the range of 90 percent). Id. Presumably this means
that 90 percent of the people that have the relevant information receive loans, not that 90 percent of the
people that enter the store seeking a loan are successful.
23.
See Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc., supra note 13, at 4 (“Immediately upon
completion of the approval process, the customer is given cash or a check . . . .”); SHEILA BAIR, UNIV.
OF MASS. AT AMHERST, LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 24 (2005),
http://www.consumercreditresearchfoundation.org/_files/AnnieECaseyStudy.pdf.
24.
Sources in the industry advise us that defaulted payday loan debt sells for about three cents
on the dollar, considerably less than the ten to twelve cents on the dollar for which first-run defaulted
credit card debt sells. Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
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Insurance Corporation (FDIC) study by Mark Flannery and Katherine Samolyk,
the typical store is surprisingly small, with an outstanding loan portfolio of less
than $100,000 and annual revenues of about $350,000. As stores age, their
profitability increases substantially—a typical new store will make fewer than
1000 loans per year, while a mature store will make more than 8500 loans per
year.25 Because so many of a store’s costs are fixed, the costs per loan from the
26
mature stores are much lower than the costs per loan from the newer stores.
It is generally thought that repeat customers are important to the business
model.27 Flannery and Samolyk report that about 46 percent of all loans are
either renewals of existing loans or new loans that follow immediately upon the
payment of an existing loan (rollovers).28 At the same time, however, Flannery
and Samolyk find no evidence that loan rollovers and repeat borrowers affect
store profits beyond their proportional contribution to total loan volume.29
It is possible that the Flannery and Samolyk study understates this phenomenon. For example, a study by the Center for Responsible Lending, using data
from North Carolina regulators, reports that 91 percent of loans are made to
30
borrowers with five or more loans per year. Similarly, Paul Chessin’s recent
analysis of Colorado data suggests that about 65 percent of loan volume in the
state comes from customers that borrow more than twelve times per year.
Chessin notes a particular pattern—“borrowing from Peter to pay Paul”—in
which customers avoid renewal limits by alternating between lenders, using the
funds from each lender to pay off the other in turn.31
Although loss rates are lower than the riskiness of the customer base
might suggest, losses still consume a substantial portion of industry revenues.

25.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 9. In the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) study, a mature store was one more than four years old. Id. at 8–9.
26.
See ERNST & YOUNG TAX POLICY SERVS. GROUP, THE COST OF PROVIDING PAYDAY
LOANS IN CANADA 39–43 (2004) [hereinafter E&Y CANADA STUDY], http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/
reports/EYPaydayLoanReport.pdf. Chris Robinson at York University has made this same point: Large
operations have lower costs than small operations, allowing larger lenders to make a profit with stricter rate
caps. CHRIS ROBINSON, REGULATION OF PAYDAY LENDING IN CANADA (2006), available at
http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Centers/Press/Report/Payday_Lending_Canada.pdf#search=%22acorn%20
study%20payday%20lenders%20canada%22; see also James Daw, Consumer Protection in the Wind on
Payday Loans, TORONTO STAR, May 30, 2006, at D6 (discussing the Robinson report).
27.
The dependency makes sense. We know from annual reports that rollover loans are faster and
easier for customers to obtain than the initial loan and that they are less expensive for lenders to
process. See QC Holdings, Inc., supra note 15, at 8 (“Once the initial application and loan process
is completed, future transactions can be processed in only a few minutes.”).
28.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 12–13 fig.2.
29.
Id. at 2.
30.
KEITH ERNST ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY
LENDING 2 (2004), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf.
31.
Chessin, supra note 17, at 411.

Just Until Payday

865

In Flannery and Samolyk’s sample, for example, losses and collection expenses
amounted to roughly $6 per loan at mature stores and about $9 per loan at young
stores.32 When added to local operating expenses, but excluding any allocation
for overhead for the chain, this produces a total cost per $100 of $11 for mature
stores and $14 for young stores, an amount sufficiently below the typical fee of
$15 to $20 per $100 to leave an opportunity for profitable operation.33 The
multivariate analysis that Flannery and Samolyk provide suggests one other key
point of interest: The costs of serving high-frequency borrowers are much less
than the costs of serving low-frequency borrowers. This is true, they emphasize,
both because the loss ratios are significantly lower for high-frequency borrowers
and because the operating costs are lower.34 As sources in the industry explained
to us, a loan to a first-time borrower is likely to require verification of the validity
of a telephone number and a bank account, as well as some investigation of the
identity of the borrower.35 Those steps—which are costly in the context of a
loan with a fee of only $30—can be omitted for repeat customers. Also, the
mere fact that a borrower is a repeat borrower provides valuable information
about reliability: This is a customer with a demonstrated propensity to repay,
something that a first-time customer will not have demonstrated.
B.

The Competitive Structure of the Payday Lending Industry

Because an understanding of the competitive landscape is important to
designing a sensible set of policy recommendations, it is useful to sketch the
basic structure of the payday lending industry. For present purposes, four sets of
players are important: mom-and-pop providers, large national providers, banks,
and Internet providers.
1.

Mom-and-Pop Providers

First, there is a very large and vaguely defined set of local providers that
we might euphemistically call mom-and-pop providers. Because these entities
are not publicly traded, it is hard to generalize about them. A couple observations, however, are useful. On the one hand, the fact that much of the
growth of the larger providers has come from acquisitions of mom-and-pop

32.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10. This is consistent with the loss rates that Paul
Chessin reports. See Chessin, supra note 17, at 408 (reporting loss rates of about 3.3 percent).
33.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10.
34.
Id. at 16–17.
35.
Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
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providers36 might suggest that the larger providers are crowding out these
smaller providers—just as surely as Borders, Barnes & Noble, and Amazon.com
crowd out local independent booksellers. On the other hand, the majority of
stores in the industry are still small shops, as large national providers have less
than 5000 locations, far less than a quarter of the total stores. The mom-and-pop
providers still dominate the market.
The most important question about these mom-and-pop providers is
how they have managed to make money in this industry without the benefit
of the payday lending statutes (discussed below) that exempt them from usury
limits in the range of 20 to 30 percent.37 We see two possibilities. One is that
these providers are more efficient in their business practices than the large
national providers (which clearly cannot operate profitably by making loans
at such a low rate).38 The other is that the small size of these providers allows
them to operate under the radar in more or less chronic violation of applicable
laws governing usury and debt collection. We have no direct evidence on
this point, but the best indirect evidence points toward the latter hypothesis. In
particular, the high fixed costs that tend to make larger lenders more efficient
than smaller lenders suggest that the first hypothesis is not accurate.39

36.
As we explain above, mature stores are more likely to have a customer base of repeat
borrowers and are likely to be more profitable than new stores. Moreover, to the extent that the
mom-and-pop providers have chosen the best locations, the larger providers will be at a disadvantage if
they try to compete by opening new stores. Thus, many of the larger providers find it more profitable to
grow by acquisition than by development of new locations. E.g., First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12,
at 3 (“Because of the highly fragmented nature of both the pawn industry and the payday advance industry,
as well as the availability of certain regional chains and ‘mom & pop’ sole proprietors willing to sell their
stores, the Company believes that certain acquisition opportunities may arise from time to time.”).
37.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
38.
The Flannery and Samolyk study suggests a rate (excluding overhead and central operating
expenses) of about $14 per $100. Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10. Our interviews with
industry professionals suggest that this rate is probably a bit high, especially for multiline stores that have
more products against which to offset the fixed costs of a branch. Interviews with Anonymous (spring
2006) (on file with authors). But they all agree that the lowest possible cost estimate under current
circumstances is greater than $10 per $100. Interestingly, in the view of our industry sources, the cost of
credit losses (estimated at about $3 per $100) far exceeds the cost of funds (less than $1 per $100).
39.
Consider, for example, the “loan shark predator.” See Duwayne Escobedo, Loan Shark
Predator: Tale of Alabama Man’s Payday Lending Schemes, INDEP. NEWS, July 20, 2006, available at
http://www.inweekly.net/article.asp?artID=3233 (discussing felony criminal charges against John
Gill, Jr., a wealthy Alabama resident being pursued by consumer-finance regulators for illegal-lending
activities in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
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Large National Providers

The second group is the large national providers, a set of aggressively growing, publicly traded companies that are moving rapidly into as many jurisdictions
as possible with as many locations as possible. These businesses operate on a
McDonald’s philosophy—with a specific business model to be replicated in as
many retail outlets nationwide as they can identify suitable locations.40
Although the annual reports of these large national providers trumpet their
unique characteristics, to the outsider, these companies seem analogous to
McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s, all trying to pursue very similar business
models, hoping to get the best locations for their chain as rapidly as possible. A
brief description of the five largest players is adequate to illustrate the point. The
largest pure payday lender in the country is Advance America, with 2408 stores
in thirty-four states.41 Dollar Financial Corporation is the second largest, with
about 1300 stores, but it is much more of an international player than Advance
America (with 345 of its stores in Canada and 459 in the United Kingdom).42
The two other key players leverage their dominance in other consumer-finance
products into a major presence in this market. ACE Cash Express is a major
payday lender based on its status as the largest owner and operator of check43
Similarly, Cash
cashing stores, with 1371 stores in thirty-seven states.
America, the leading pawn lender in the country, makes payday loans from about
700 locations, mostly in its pawn shops.44 Finally, QC Holdings has a 371-store
chain built on its claim to have been one of the inventors of the modern payday
loan product in the early 1990s.45
3.

Banks

The third group of players in the industry is banks. At first glance, it
should seem odd that banks—whose credit card lending practices suggest
plenty of appetite for risky consumer lending—do not play a major role in
this market. But as we write, there are no banks that play a direct role of

40.
E.g., Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.cashamerica.com/pdf/CashAm10k05.pdf.
41.
Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc., supra note 13, at 1.
42.
Dollar Fin. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Sept. 22, 2005).
43.
ACE Cash Express, Inc., supra note 20, at 3.
44.
Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., supra note 40, at 4.
45.
QC Holdings, Inc., supra note 15, at 1.
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consequence in the payday lending market.46 To be sure, from about 2000 to
2005, banks facilitated the growth of the national payday lending providers
by partnering with them, so that the providers could avoid local usury
restrictions through the shelter of federal rules preempting the application of
those restrictions to banks. As we discuss below, that practice is largely, if not
entirely, a thing of the past.47
It is also true that most of the large national payday lenders are funded by
some of the largest banks. For example, press reports suggest that Wells Fargo
provides funding for Advance America and Cash America, that JPMorgan
Chase provides funding for Cash America and ACE Cash Express, and that Bank
of America and Wachovia provide a syndicated credit line to Advance America.
On the equity side, Fidelity Funds is the largest single stockholder in ACE Cash
Express, and JPMorgan and Bank of America both own more than 1 percent of
Cash America.48 But despite those investments, the role of banks in the current
market is indirect and marginal. We discuss in the closing section of Part II some
reasons why we think this is unfortunate.
4.

Internet Providers

The hardest sector of the industry to understand is the Internet-only
providers. It is clear that they exist; indeed, they have their own search
aggregator (paydayloanoffers.com), which provides advice on the best available
payday loan terms on any given day. You need only Google “payday loans,” and
you will see a large group of sponsored and natural links to online providers. To
get a sense for the most successful providers, we looked at the sponsored-links
websites that appeared when we conducted searches on “payday loans” on
46.
Wells Fargo Bank does offer a payday lending product: Direct Deposit Advance. See Wells
Fargo Checking—Direct Deposit Advance Terms and Conditions, https://www.wellsfargo.com/wf/
checking/dda/terms (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). We discuss this product in note 257. One reason banks
do not play a more direct role is cultural. Subprime borrowers might not want to use banking services even
if banks offered payday loans. Commentators from the United States, Canada, and Australia have
noted this problem. See NEFE White Paper, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the distaste payday
customers have for the “mahogany and brass” atmosphere of U.S. banks); IAIN RAMSAY, ACCESS TO
CREDIT IN THE ALTERNATIVE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKET 36 (2000), http://cmsweb.ca/epic/internet/
incmc-cmc.nsf/vwapj/ramsay_e.pdf/$FILE/ramsay_e.pdf (suggesting that Canadians with low incomes
are distrustful of banks because banks are intimidating and treat lower-income customers poorly); DEAN
WILSON, CONSUMER LAW CTR. VICT. LTD, PAYDAY LENDING IN VICTORIA—A RESEARCH REPORT
80 (2002), http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/CAV_Credit_Research/
$file/payday.pdf (attributing the preference of Australian consumers for payday lenders to the
perception that banks provide bad service to consumers).
47.
See infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
48.
JPMorgan, Banks Back Lenders Luring Poor With 780 Percent Rates, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&sid=ayYDo5tpjTY8.
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Google, Yahoo!, and MSN.49 These searches produced a total of eight
sites: mycashnow.com (Google, Yahoo!, and MSN), tendollarpaydayloan.com
and paydayselect.com (Google and Yahoo!), nationalfastcash.com and 1000easy-payday-loan.com (Yahoo! only), paydayok.com (Google only), and
cashadvancenetwork.com and instantcashloantillpayday.com (MSN only).
Several things are interesting about those search results, starting with the fact
that the dominant rate for the most prominent advertisers in the online
market appears to be about $10 per $100, significantly below the $15 per $100
rate that seems to be the benchmark rate for the retail locations of the large
national providers,50 and considerably lower than the typical rate identified in a
major 2004 survey by the Consumer Federation of America (CFA).51 Also, the
Internet providers are all Internet fronts, meaning that little about the firms is
evident from the websites. A careful reading of the website will not reveal
whether a bank is involved, in most cases will not give a brick-and-mortar
location for the lender,52 and does not suggest whether any of the large national
providers are involved. The only information of significance about the lawfulness
of the transactions is an assertion that the transactions are governed by the
law of the lender’s location.53

49.
These searches produce different results, even on the same day. We report here a set of
companies found based on repeated searches on May 14 and 15, 2006.
50.
The rates at the sponsored-link websites varied. See 1000 Easy Payday Loan, http://www.1000easy-paydayloan.com (providing $10 per $100); Payday Loans and Cash Advances at PayDay OK,
http://www.paydayOK.com (same); Ten Dollar Payday Loans, http://www.tendollarpaydayloans.com
(same); see also Cash Advances at Payday Select, http://www.paydayselect.com ($15 per $100);
Quick and Affordable Cash Advances, http://www.mycashnow.com ($18 per $100); Cash
Advance Network, http://www.cashadvancenetwork.com ($30 per $100); Instant Payday
Loans, http://www.instantcashloantillpayday.com ($30 per $100); National Cash Fast,
http://www.nationalcashfast.com (unspecified rates) (all last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
51.
JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., INTERNET PAYDAY
LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE BORROWERS IN DEBT AND
EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 22 (2004) [hereinafter CFA SURVEY],
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Internet_Payday_Lending113004.pdf.
52.
Of the eight sites, only paydayselect.com and paydayok.com offered any address; both offered
(different) post office boxes in Ruidoso, New Mexico. The CFA survey suggests that this is not a new
problem. See id. at 20–22. Those sites now list Delaware addresses and show licenses indicating that
they are subject to Delaware law.
53.
Of the eight, only three identify what that law is: Mycashnow.com selects the law of Grenada,
MyCashNow—Disclosures, http://www.mycashnow.com/Cash-Today-disclosure.php (last visited Mar.
4, 2007), and paydayselect.com and paydayok.com select the law of New Mexico. It is unlikely these
choice-of-law clauses are enforceable because most states’ long-arm statutes permit states to enforce their
own laws for loans to citizens within the state. For a detailed account of this jurisdictional issue, see
Frank Burt et al., Journey to the Fringe: A Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products, in CONSUMER
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE (11TH ANNUAL), at 349, 381–82 (PLI Corporate Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8565, 2006).
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Several possibilities exist about these lenders, all of which are speculative
in the absence of direct evidence that we have been unable to obtain. One
possibility is that the only way these lenders can profit at the low rates is by
cheating. There certainly is considerable indirect evidence to support that
perspective. For example, the CFA survey suggests that the overwhelming
majority of these lenders charge fees that far exceed the maximum permitted
under the law of the location of their customers.54 Similarly, many of these
lenders may violate federal law by forcing borrowers to grant them electronic
access to their bank accounts.55 There are other possibilities, of course. One
regulator who has dealt with some of these providers suggests that they can
profit at rates lower than the large national providers because they avoid the
costs of retail-branch locations.56 This raises the possibility that the market for
payday loans is segmented, between the relatively low-income customers that
seek out lenders based solely on retail proximity to their employer and the
relatively better-off customers that use broadband Internet access and Google
searches to find their payday lender of choice.57
This is not to say that there is no fraud in the Internet payday lending
industry. On the contrary, illegal lending is common in this sector.58 For exam59
60
ple, both New York and Pennsylvania have had recent notable enforcement
actions against Internet providers. It is not clear to us, however, that those kinds
of providers are the providers purchasing sponsored advertisements on Google
or other major Internet search engines. Rather, they seem to us a sort of Internet
underworld much like the brick-and-mortar underworld that populates some share
of the mom-and-pop providers. Recent activity in the industry—most notably the
acquisition by Cash America (a large national operation) of a major licensed
54.
See generally CFA SURVEY, supra note 51, at 22.
55.
See generally id. at 34 (discussing the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693k
(1998), which prohibits a credit transaction conditioned on electronic access to the borrower’s
deposit account).
56.
Interview with Sealy Hutchings, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Office of the Consumer Credit Comm’r,
in Austin, Tex. (Feb. 28, 2006).
57.
One website specializing in payday loans in Houston illustrates how the Internet may
enhance competition among lenders generally. Cash Advance Loan Houston promises to display five
lending options for people seeking a payday loan in Houston. See Houston Cash Advance Loans,
http://www.cash-advance-loan-houston.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
58.
See Associated Press, Payday Lenders Use Internet to Avoid Law, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2004),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-12-01-usurious-lending-online_x.htm.
59.
See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Internet Concerns Top
Consumer Complaints (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/feb/feb08a_06.html
(discussing enforcement action against New York Catalog Sales).
60.
See Press Release, Pa. Office of Attorney Gen., Commonwealth Shuts Down Alleged Illegal
Web-Based “Payday Lending” Scheme (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/
press.aspx?id=670 (discussing enforcement action against Ace Pays).
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Internet lender (CashNetUSA)61—might presage consolidation in this sector
similar to the consolidation that has been occurring in the brick-and-mortar sector.
C.

The Regulatory Structure of the Payday Lending Industry

1.

Federal Regulations

The recent enactment of the Talent-Nelson amendment62—which imposes
a 36 percent cap on many loans to military personnel and their dependents—has
given prominence to the possibility that federal law might someday limit the
63
operations of payday lenders more broadly. For now, however, the role of
federal law is limited. Although there is no federal licensing regime for payday
lenders, and certainly no federal rate ceiling, the Consumer Credit Protection Act
affects the operations of payday lenders in important ways. Most importantly, the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires conspicuous disclosure of finance charges
and interest rates, communicated in dollar amounts and percentages.64 If, as
we argue below, TILA plays an important role in confusing consumers in
this market, it is a significant, albeit perverse, part of the regulatory regime.
What is more interesting is federal displacement of state regulation. For
example, section 85 of the National Bank Act permits any national bank to
charge an interest rate as high as the maximum rate permitted by the laws of
the state where the bank is “located.”65 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1978 decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
61.
See Erick Bergquist, Cash America Buying Online Lender Licensed in 27 States, AM.
BANKER, July 11, 2006. Consistent with this discussion, Cash America’s chief executive officer,
Daniel Feehan, commented that CashNetUSA “is one of the few companies that we have found
operating in this space that has gone through the very rigorous process of getting licensed state by
state and organizing their technology to deliver documents in accordance with state laws.”
Spotlight on Financial Services—Forecasts and Statistics, Online Payday Loans (Sept. 2006),
http://www.spotlightonfinance.org/2006/September/product-story2.htm.
62.
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 987).
63.
In our view, the case for regulating borrowing by military personnel is weak. If there is a link
between financial distress and payday lending, it affects both civilian and military populations. See Morgan
Stanley Equity Research, Advance America: Initiating With an Underweight-V Rating 25 exhibit 20
(Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with authors) (table showing inverse correlation between median income level in
a state and the number of households per branch). Further, military personnel are not likely to be more
susceptible to cognitive biases than the low-income civilians who routinely use these products.
64.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1998 & Supp. 2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (2006). Courts and regulators
have clarified that the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) governs payday loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 226
(Supp. I 2007), § 226.2(a)(14) (2006) (concluding that payday loans are covered by the Regulation
Z disclosure rules); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, TN, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047
(M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Courts that have addressed the issue have held, without exception, that deferred
presentment transactions are extensions of ‘credit’ under TILA.”).
65.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
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Service Corp.,66 it has been clear that a bank is located, for purposes of that
provision, in the state of the bank’s headquarters. Thus, a national bank
located in a state with no usury limit (like South Dakota or Delaware) can
import that rate into any other state in which it does business.67
Federal law also gives state-chartered banks a parallel right to import rates,
under section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institutions, . . . [any FDIC-insured] bank . . . may, notwithstanding any
State constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes
of this section, . . . charge on any loan . . . interest . . . at the rate allowed by
68
the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located.

Banks in this country, for various historical reasons, have had little interest in participating directly in the payday lending market. During the early
years of this decade, however, many banks partnered with large national
providers so that those providers could use the federal preemptive shelter
available to the banks to operate programs that otherwise would have violated
state usury laws.69 This activity—generally decried as “rent-a-bank” or “rent-a70
charter” programs —ultimately came under scrutiny by federal regulators.
One by one, those regulators barred banks under their supervision from
participating in payday lending programs operated by third parties. For nationally chartered banks, the comptroller of the currency took action in 2000
and 2001 to prevent national banks from teaming up with state banks.71 The
Federal Reserve did not take formal action to stop the activity of national
banks or of those state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve.72
66.
439 U.S. 299, 310–12 (1978).
67.
See Schiltz, supra note 4, at 552–53.
68.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2001); see BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)
(applying this provision to a bank involved in payday lending), vacated as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Schiltz, supra note 4, at 565–69 (discussing the 1980 adoption of this provision).
69.
See Chad A. Cicconi, A Role for Payday Lenders, 123 BANKING L.J. 235, 239–40 (2006).
70.
E.g., Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 723, 732 (2004).
71.
See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
ADVISORY LETTER 2000-9: THIRD-PARTY RISK (2000), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-9.doc;
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ADVISORY
LETTER 2000-10: PAYDAY LENDING (2000), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-10.doc;
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OCC BULL.
NO. 2001-47: THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS (2001), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2001-47.doc.
72.
Indeed, both Chairman Greenspan and Chairman Bernanke have taken quite benevolent
views of the industry. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Rep. Melvin L.
Watt (Jan. 2, 2001) (copy on file with author) (recounting the preference “that markets and
competition—enhanced by appropriate disclosures—regulate loan terms and conditions”); Letter from
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Rep. Pat Tiberi (Aug. 16, 2004) (copy on file with
author) (reiterating the view that no action is necessary with regard to payday lending); Ben S. Bernanke,
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But concerns of regulators about the transparency of operations did cause
one large partnering bank to leave the Federal Reserve System to avoid the
scrutiny of federal regulators.73
Since the FDIC had not acted, state banks remained relatively free to
engage in this activity. Thus, the County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware
gained considerable notoriety for its continued participation.74 In July 2005,
75
however, the FDIC issued its Guidelines on Payday Lending. Although these
regulations do not directly prohibit partnering with third-party payday lenders,
they do impose onerous capital requirements and compel institutions to “[l]imit
the number and frequency of extensions, deferrals, [and] renewals.”76 In
practice, these new regulations have made it impractical for state-chartered
banks to continue partnering with the major national providers. Accordingly,
by early 2006, the “rent-a-charter” era had come to an end.77

Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Fifth Regional Issues Conference of the Fifteenth
Congressional District of Texas, (June 13, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2006/20060613/default.htm (praising the spread of payday lenders as a source of alternative
financial services for lower-income families).
73.
First Bank of Delaware relinquished its Federal Reserve membership in 2003, and thus
became subject to regulation by the FDIC. See Letter from Jean Ann Fox, President, Consumer
Fed’n of Am., to Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC (Oct. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/fdicletter10-2003.pdf. To get a sense for the concerns of the
applicable regulator (the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), see the skeptical comments about
the safety and soundness of payday lending in Robert W. Snarr, Jr., No Cash ‘til Payday: The
Payday Lending Industry, COMPLIANCE CORNER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Phila., Pa.), 1st
Quarter 2002, at CC1, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/src/srcinsights/srcinsights/pdf/ccq1.pdf.
74.
For instance, Dollar Financial had an important relationship with the County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach. See Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 11.
75.
See FDIC: Guidelines for Payday Lending, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday
(last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
76.
Id.
77.
The clearest signal is the Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam decision in April 2006 to dismiss as
moot a major case involving a challenge by several state-chartered banks to a Georgia law designed to
exclude the partners of those banks from operating in Georgia. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 446 F.3d 1358
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacating as moot, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). The annual reports from
large payday lenders filed in the second half of 2005 confirm that payday lenders got the message. See, e.g.,
ACE Cash Express, Inc., supra note 20, at 9 (“The revised FDIC guidelines became effective on July 1,
2005, and affect the loans offered at our stores by Republic Bank. In fiscal 2006, we have introduced two
new loan products to our Texas customers and one new loan product to our customers in Arkansas and
Pennsylvania that provide alternatives to the loan product offered by Republic Bank. These new loan
products will provide consumers who exceed the maximum allowable payday loans under the revised FDIC
guidelines access to the credit they require.”); Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 11 (“The Payday Lending
Guidance, among other things, limits the period a borrower may have payday loans outstanding from any
FDIC-insured bank to three months during a twelve-month period. As a result of the Payday Lending
Guidance, we are transitioning from the bank-funded consumer loan model to the company-funded
consumer loan model in most of the states where we previously offered bank-funded consumer loans. As
part of this transition, we terminated our relationship with County Bank and amended our relationship
with First Bank, in each case by mutual agreement.”).
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State Regulations

As federal regulators remove the protective umbrella of federal law, we
enter an era in which states will be free to make their own choices about payday
lending. As far as we can tell, all states that tolerate payday lending have
some scheme of licensing or regulation.
The first question, however, is whether states will tolerate payday lending
78
at all. On that question, current state law varies greatly. In an effort to provide
an orderly description of the landscape as it exists today—a snapshot at the end
of the rent-a-charter era—we identify three distinct regulatory regimes: explicit
toleration; formal, but underenforced prohibition; and true prohibition. We
recognize the difficulties of understanding the actual regulatory practices in any
particular state. But there is considerable illustrative value in summarizing some
representative examples. For this purpose, we have chosen Michigan as an
example of explicit toleration, Texas as an example of formal but underenforced
prohibition, and New York as an example of true prohibition.
a.

Explicit Toleration

State law related to payday lending varies greatly, but the most common
situation is a statute that explicitly authorizes the practice. The Community
Financial Services Association (CFSA), a trade group representing the major
payday lenders, has supported a model bill in numerous state legislatures in
recent years,79 and has had noted success in obtaining adoption: The CFSA
website claims that a majority of the states have adopted “balanced,
responsible legislation,” which presumably resembles their bill.80 The model
bill contains several notable features: Loans can only be made for $500 or
less;81 loans can only be renewed one time;82 borrowers can rescind a loan within
78.
For detailed breakdowns of the different state laws governing payday lending, see Flannery &
Samolyk, supra note 9, at 30 tbl.1; Moss, supra note 2, at 1740. The most comprehensive and accessible
information is at NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 2005 SUMMARY OF STATE PAYDAY LOAN ACTS
(2005), http://www.consumerlaw.org/action_agenda/payday_loans/content/NCLC_SUMMARY.pdf.
79.
The Community Financial Services Association (CFSA) supports the Deferred Deposit
Loan Act, see Email from Kara J. Marshall, Staff Attorney, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, to Jim Hawkins
(May 25, 2006, 16:37:43 CST) (on file with authors), adopted by the Committee on Suggested
State Legislation of the Council of State Governments, see Deferred Deposit Loans, in 61
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 34, 34–37 (2002) [hereinafter Model Deferred Deposit Act],
http://www.csg.org/programs/ ssl/documents/2002.pdf. For a discussion of the lobbying and the model
bill, see Chessin, supra note 17, at 398.
80.
The Community Financial Services Association of America, http://www.cfsa.net/regulated_
states.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
81.
Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 79, § 6 at 35.
82.
Id. § 8 at 36.
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a day;83 lenders must obtain licenses to operate;84 lenders cannot use threats of
criminal prosecution as a collection tool;85 and, most striking, fees are capped at
86
20 percent of the first $300 lent and 7.5 percent of any funds lent over $300.
Michigan’s 2005 adoption of the euphemistically named Deferred
Presentment Service Transactions Act is a good example of a statute that draws
from the CFSA’s model act and tolerates payday lending.87 This is a detailed
statute, with thirty-three sections divided into four articles. Setting aside the first
88
article (which offers a title and a series of definitions), the remaining articles
89
90
deal with licensing, regulation of the transaction, and remedies.91 The licensing article requires a license for any company engaged in the business of “deferred
presentment service transactions,” except for a federally insured bank.92 The
statute defines “deferred presentment service transaction” to include any transaction in which the licensee agrees to pay the customer a sum of money, in
exchange for a fee, and then to “[h]old a customer’s check for a period of time
before negotiation, redemption, or presentment of the check[ ].”93 To obtain
a license, the licensee must show a net worth of at least $50,000 per location, up to
a maximum requirement of $250,000, as well as “the financial responsibility,
financial condition, business experience, character, and general fitness to
reasonably warrant a belief that the applicant will conduct its business lawfully
and fairly.”94 Each licensee is also obligated to post a $50,000 surety bond.95
Of greatest interest, Michigan’s licensing article includes a provision—which
is not in the CFSA’s model act—that requires the state commissioner of the office of
financial services to develop a statewide database “that has real-time access through
an internet connection . . . [and] is accessible at all times to licensees,” which will,
among other things, allow any licensee to “[v]erify whether a customer has any
open deferred presentment service transactions with any licensee . . . .”96
83.
Id. § 6 at 35.
84.
Id. § 16 at 37.
85.
Id. § 20 at 37.
86.
Id. § 5 at 35.
87.
See Deferred Presentment Service Transactions Act, ch. 487, 2005 Mich. Legis. Serv. 244
(West) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 487.2121–.2173 (West Supp. 2006)).
88.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 487.2121–.2122 (West Supp. 2006). For other similar
examples, see CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 23000–23106 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 122/1-1 (West 1999).
89.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 487.2131–.2142 (West Supp. 2006).
90.
Id. §§ 487.2151–.2160.
91.
Id. §§ 487.2165–.2173.
92.
Id. § 487.2131.
93.
Id. § 487.2122(1)(g).
94.
Id. § 487.2132.
95.
Id. § 487.2134.
96.
Id. § 487.2142.
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The substantive article that regulates transactions focuses primarily on
disclosure. Thus, licensees must post large signs (in 36-point type) emphasizing
to customers several of the constraints the Act imposes, including the following
statements: “[W]e must . . . give you a copy of your signed agreement”; “[s]tate
law prohibits us from using any criminal process to collect on an agreement”;
“[s]tate law entitles you to information regarding filing a complaint against us if
you believe that we have violated the law.”97 The signs must also include
precatory advice, such as the admonition that “[y]ou should use this service
only to meet short-term cash needs.”98 The same notices must be included in a
99
written agreement that the customer signs.
There are also substantive restrictions. First, the maximum transaction is
capped at $600,100 and a licensee cannot extend funds if a search of the state
database indicates that the borrower has more than one transaction open with
another licensee.101 This provision is important, given empirical evidence
suggesting that borrowers often obtain payday loans from multiple providers.102
Second, although the statute is not clearly written, it appears to cap the maximum fee at a declining amount, starting at $15 for the first $100, and declining to
$11 for the sixth $100.103 Third, the licensee cannot tie the purchase of any
104
other financial service to the deferred presentment service transaction.
The licensee can require arbitration in its contracts only if the licensee agrees
to bear all of the costs and if the arbitration occurs no more than ten miles from
the borrower’s address as stated in the agreement.105 Finally, the statute
prohibits criminal penalties for failure to pay checks given in deferred
presentment service transactions.106
97.
Id. § 487.2151(1).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. § 487.2152.
100.
Id. § 487.2153(1). This is $100 greater than the model bill’s limit.
101.
Id. §§ 487.2153(2), 487.2154.
102.
See Chessin, supra note 17, at 411–12 (suggesting that this is common in Colorado); Mayer,
supra note 6, at 5–6.
103.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2153(1)(a) (West Supp. 2006). The statute states that a
licensee can charge a service fee. Id. § 487.2153(1). It then states that the licensee “may charge both of
the following as part of the service fee.” Id. One of the items that follows is a database verification
fee, if approved by the commissioner (not yet in place). Id. § 487.2153(1)(b). The other is the
sliding-scale fee discussed in the text. Id. § 487.2153(1)(a). The statute as written seems to permit the
possibility that the lender could charge some other fee as part of the “service fee.” Governor Granholm’s
press release praising the bill when she signed it, however, explicitly adopts the interpretation
discussed in the text. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Granholm’s Consumer
Protections Against Payday Lenders Wins Legislative Approval (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.michigan.gov/gov/
0,1607,7-168-23442-129955—,00.html.
104.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2160(a) (West Supp. 2006).
105.
Id. § 487.2152(3).
106.
Id. § 487.2158(4).
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Equally significant is what the statute does not regulate. First, notice that
these provisions do not impose a limit on rollover transactions. On that point,
the statute grants the customer what seems to us an unpalatable option, which is
unlikely to be attractive to any large group of customers: A customer that enters
into eight transactions in any twelve-month period must be granted the option to
repay the outstanding debt in three installments, with one installment due on
each subsequent payday.107 Second, the statute grants a direct exemption from
usury laws, explicitly providing that the service fee that the statute authorizes “is
not interest.”108 Because the normal usury limit in Michigan is 10 percent,109
110
some exemption obviously is necessary for this type of business to operate.
The final article, related to remedies, includes straightforward provisions
that permit customers to file complaints with the commissioner111 and permit the
commissioner to investigate those complaints, issue cease and desist orders,
suspend or revoke licenses, and impose fines.112 Lastly, the statute creates a
private cause of action for any “person injured by a licensee’s violation” of the
act, including a right to reasonable attorney’s fees.113
b.

Underenforced Prohibition

The second common pattern in recent years has been a formal prohibition
of payday lending, coupled with a lack of resources or effort adequate to make
the prohibition effective.114 The prohibition normally takes the form of a usury
limit that has no specific exception authorizing payday lending transactions.
The ineffectiveness of usury limits is apparent from participation in the market
not only by small, under-the-radar, local providers, but also by large national
107.
Id. § 487.2155.
108.
Id. § 487.2153(1).
109.
Id. § 438.101.
110.
Lest that rate seem unrealistic, you should recall that federal law preempts the state rule with
respect to many important lending transactions, including home mortgages and loans issued by federally
insured banks. See MANN, supra note 14, Assignment 20; James J. White, The Usury Trompe L’Oeil,
51 S.C. L. REV. 445 (2000). Michigan can retain such a low rate primarily because the rate does not
apply to transactions of financial significance.
111.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2165 (West Supp. 2006).
112.
Id. §§ 487.2165–2168.
113.
Id. § 487.2173.
114.
There are obvious public-choice explanations for underenforcement. The lenders might have
sufficient influence on policymakers in these states to ensure that regulators will not actually exclude them.
A second possibility is resource limitations. Many jurisdictions, for example, may not be accustomed to
devoting the level of resources to financial regulatory enforcement that is typical of New York in the
era of Eliot Spitzer. Finally, efforts to enforce anti-payday loan legislation would have been more
difficult until the events of the last few years limited the ability of payday loan providers to avoid
regulation by the states in which they lend.
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providers, which typically have operated under the shelter of an out-of-state
bank. Here, Texas provides a good example.115
Like many states, Texas has a complex set of usury ceilings with different
levels applicable to different kinds of loans. In general, however, the highest permissible ceiling for loans below $250,000 is capped at 24 percent.116 Yet, Texas
has, for many years, had a special statute to permit low-dollar consumer-finance
transactions, referred to as “cash advance loans.”117 The problem, however, is
that this statute does not authorize charges at a level typical of the standard
payday lending product. Specifically, the maximum charge it permits is capped
at a fixed fee of $10 per $100 of cash advance, plus $4 per month. So, for a
loan of $300 for two weeks (a typical product), the maximum fee would be
$16,118 much less than the $45 fee the typical payday lender would charge based

115.
Although we do not discuss it in detail here, Canada provides an even starker example.
Formally, Canada’s federal usury limit of 60 percent, Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 347(2)
(2006), would make payday lending illegal. Yet, the evidence suggests that payday lending has been
flourishing in recent years, unfettered by prosecution. The Toronto Star reported that as of 2005, there had
been no prosecutions against payday lenders. Jim Rankin & Nicole MacIntyre, Loans Firm Curbed,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 31, 2004, at A1. The highly visible growth of the payday lending industry,
however, has produced a backlash in the last year or so, reflected in a growing number of highly visible
actions challenging what, in some cases, might be flagrantly illegal activity. E.g., Kilroy v. A OK Payday
Loans, Inc., No. S041137, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 927 (B.C.S.C. Aug. 9, 2006), available at 2006 A.C.W.S.J.
LEXIS 6646 (holding in a class action that the rates charged by payday lenders exceeded the criminal
statutory limit); Daw, supra note 26 (describing police action against one payday lender in Manitoba);
Carol Goar, Payday Loan Industry in Court, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 1, 2006, at A18; Jim Rankin, Suit Against
Payday Lender Gets a Boost, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 2006, at A12; Class Action Certified in Payday Loan
Case, CBC NEWS, May 12, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2006/05/12/rentcash.html?ref=rss.
The standard product issued by the large lenders apparently complies with usury laws by offering the
borrowers the option of repaying loans in cash with only 60 percent interest. If the borrower is unable to
repay in cash, the lender cashes a check (charging the standard payday loan rate as a check-cashing fee)
and uses the proceeds to repay the loan. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 18–19.
It remains to be seen whether the adoption by the Canadian Payday Loan Association of a voluntary
code of compliance will stem criticism. The Code of Best Business Practices bans, among other
things, rollover loans and associated products. Canadian Payday Loan Ass’n, Code of Best Business
Practices, http://www.cpla-acps.ca/english/consumercode.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2007). It does
not, however, specifically regulate the basic rates that members charge, id., which is the basis for
much of the existing litigation. The situation is now drawing substantial attention at the federal level,
where the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce has published a detailed
report concluding that the spread of payday lenders is “alarming, since we do not believe that they are
adequately regulated.” STANDING SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, TRADE & COMMERCE, CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 79 (2006). For a
lucid and balanced discussion of the Canadian situation, see Jacob Ziegel, Payday Loan Bedlam Cries
Out for Legal Fix, NATIONAL POST, Mar. 15, 2006, at FP23.
116.
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 303.009 (Vernon 2006) (ceiling based on twice the federal T-bill
rate that floats between 18 and 24 percent per annum).
117.
Id. ch. 342.
118.
$10 + (0.5)($4)(3).
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on a $15 per $100 fee schedule. Accordingly, Texas is listed prominently on
the CFSA website as a state with laws “that are unfavorable” to the industry.119
Yet, when we review annual reports for the large national providers, we
discover that most of them—Advance America, Cash America, Ace Cash
Express, Dollar Financial Corp., and QC Holdings—have locations in Texas.120
Indeed, several companies even locate their principal offices in Texas.121 In each
case, the annual reports indicate that the lenders do not operate directly in
Texas; rather, they operate using rates imported through their partnership with
an out-of-state bank, most often County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware.122
As discussed above, the FDIC’s decision to stop this kind of rate importation has
driven County Bank and similar banks from this business. Thus, it appears that
Texas and similarly situated states will have an opportunity in the next few years
to make a real choice about whether to tolerate payday lending.123
c.

True Prohibition

The final existing regulatory outcome is outright prohibition of payday
loans. A good example of this approach is in New York, where the general usury
limit is 6 percent per annum,124 with an exception that permits banks to charge
16 percent per annum.125 What raises our interest, however, is the utter absence

119.
CFSA, STATES RESPOND TO EMERGING INDUSTRY 1 (2003), http://www.cfsa.net/govrelat/
pdf/states%20respond%20to%20emerging%20industry.pdf.
120.
We should also add two regional publicly traded providers with a substantial presence in
Texas: EZCorp and FirstCash.
121.
First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12, at 1; Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., supra note 40, at 1.
122.
E.g., Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 11.
123.
There is one particular problem that Texas regulators face, which arises from Texas’s odd credit
service organizations statute, TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. ch. 393 (Vernon 2006). That statute permits brokers
to charge a fee for finding credit for distressed borrowers. It has found favor in recent years as a vehicle for
consumer lenders to avoid usury restrictions by charging a brokerage fee that is parallel to the standard
interest charges lenders would charge. Indeed, as we understand it based on interviews with Texas’s Office
of Consumer Credit Commissioner, most payday lenders operating in the state as of 2006 rely on this
structure. See Erick Bergquist, One More Reason to Pursue Alternate Models in Payday, AM. BANKER, Feb.
28, 2006 (discussing reliance on a credit service organization model by national providers losing their
bank partners but wishing to continue operations in Texas); Interview with Sealy Hutchings, supra
note 56. Surprisingly enough, the Fifth Circuit recently has validated this apparently evasive tactic.
See Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing RICO claims brought by
borrower from car-title lender). It remains to be seen whether Texas courts would adopt the same
view, especially if the litigation were brought by the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner,
rather than a private plaintiff. There also is the likelihood that the Texas Legislature might explicitly
close this loophole entirely as part of payday lending legislation currently under consideration.
124.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2001).
125.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(1) (McKinney 2001); see also Seidel v. 18 E. 17th St. Owners,
Inc., 598 N.E.2d 7 (N.Y. 1992) (discussing the relative severity of New York usury laws).
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of New York locations from the annual reports of the large national providers.
Not a single one of those providers appears to have locations in New York.
Interested in how this can be so—given the ease with which bankpartnered providers have operated in Texas—we spoke to an officer in the
New York Attorney General’s Office responsible for usury enforcement.126 He
stated that New York has managed to exclude payday lenders only through
conspicuously aggressive enforcement. Thus, he is quite confident that the large
national providers know that they would face litigation immediately if they
opened stores in New York. In his view, the out-of-state national providers,
even if they rented charters from an out-of-state bank (like County Bank), could
not possibly prevail because the loans in fact are made by the national providers,
not by the banks.127 The difference, it seems, is not in the usury limit but in the
ability of regulators to bring and prevail in litigation to enforce those limits. As
the rent-a-charter era closes, it should be even easier for states like New York
to repel the national providers, if they choose to do so.128

II.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON PAYDAY LENDING

If we are correct, the rapid growth of payday lenders, coupled with the end
of the rent-a-charter era, presents state legislatures and policymakers with a
sharply defined opportunity to decide the terms, if any, on which payday lending
should be tolerated. Existing scholarship has provided little guidance for
policymakers wrestling with those questions. Scholars generally have proposed
increased regulatory oversight based on the assumption that regulation, or even
prohibition, is self-evidently desirable. In our view, the rationales for regulating
payday lending markets are difficult to assess. We try here to sketch what seem to
us the most obvious arguments for, and against, different rationales for regulation.
In general, we suggest three perspectives that policymakers might
adopt. First, policymakers might conclude that the market is inherently objectionable, and thus that laws should be enacted that in practice prohibit

126.
Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
127.
This argument was successful in Georgia, where a state statute designed to prevent rent-acharter operations in the state bars rate importation if the bank’s local agent retains more than 50
percent of the revenues (which apparently is always the case in these relationships). Efforts by the large
national providers to enjoin operation of the statute as preempted failed at the trial court and before a
panel of the Eleventh Circuit, before the case ultimately was dismissed as moot, apparently because of
the cessation of this kind of banking activity discussed above in Subpart I.C. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker,
411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006).
128.
Consider, for example, Betts v. McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., 879 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a payday loan was usurious because it was consummated before Florida
adopted its deferred presentment statute to validate the industry).
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payday lending. As discussed above, this is the approach in New York.129
Second, policymakers might conclude that the industry should be tolerated,
but only if it can succeed without depending on a regular practice of
repetitive lending. Third, policymakers might conclude that, on balance, the
market should be tolerated but that the potential for abuse is sufficient to justify
some form of intrusion or supervision of the market. Regulated tolerance of
some form has been chosen in the bulk of American jurisdictions, the United
Kingdom, and most Australian jurisdictions.130 We note in passing the possibility that policymakers might conclude that the costs of any plausible regulatory
intervention are likely to exceed the benefits, and thus, that no regulation is
appropriate. This approach has not found favor in any jurisdiction of which we
are aware; therefore, we do not discuss it in detail. Rather, the Subparts that
follow provide a critical analysis of the first three perspectives.
A. Should Payday Lending Be Banned?
1.

The Case Against Payday Lending

The case against payday lending, though not often articulated, is easy to
discern. Like most consumer financial transactions, payday lending transactions
tax the cognitive capabilities of the typical customer in ways that lead to market
failures of one sort or another. Thus, a person with normal experiences, normal
time constraints, and normal intelligence does not easily evaluate the risks
and rewards of a payday lending transaction. First, the customer is likely to
encounter some difficulty in forming an accurate estimate of the costs of the
transaction. If the lender is forthcoming, the customer might well understand
the specific fees directly attendant on a successful transaction: perhaps a $30 fee
129.
Several other states in the United States, the Australian state of Tasmania, France, and
Germany also adopt this regulatory posture. While some Australian states allow payday lending, Tasmania
has banned it. See WILSON, supra note 46, at 39 (citing a 48 percent cap in New South Wales, and
describing Tasmania’s prohibition). In France, the Code de la Consommation sets out the procedure for
establishing ceilings on rates each quarter at one-third above the average market rates. CODE DE LA
CONSOMMATION art. L313-3 (Fr.). In Germany, key judicial decisions in 1978 and 1980 established
the rate ceilings at, as a rule of thumb, twice the national average rate for the type of loan. DTI
REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. These rate caps effectively eliminate payday lenders from both France
and Germany. See id. at 16, 41 (explaining that high-risk borrowers in France either use state-owned
pawnbroking services or credit cards); id. at 16 (noting that Germany has no subprime-lending options).
130.
The British Consumer Credit Act allows courts to review transactions after the fact. See
infra note 217. In Australia, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) covers the overwhelming
majority of these transactions. Under the UCCC, payday lenders must disclose the annual percentage
rate (APR) in advertisements and before entering into the loan agreement. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE, 2001, §§ 14, 15, 143 (Austl.). Also, the UCCC empowers courts to review unconscionable
interest rates, id. § 72, and to reopen unjust transactions, id. § 79.
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to borrow $200. The customer is less likely to be sure, however, of costs that
might relate to an unsuccessful transaction. For example, if the check given to
the payday lender bounces when it is deposited, the customer’s depositary bank
is likely to assess a fee in an amount unknown to the customer standing at the
payday lender’s retail counter. More generally, the customer might have a poor
understanding of the costs she would incur if her failure to repay the payday
loan ultimately results in financial distress. To make matters worse, there is
every reason to think that common decisionmaking problems like the availability heuristic and the optimism bias cause the typical consumer to give
inadequate weight to the risk that the transaction will turn out poorly.131
Second, there is some reason to be concerned that customers will do such
a poor job of comparing alternative lending transactions that the market will
not force prices to a competitive level. For one thing, customers will have great
difficulty comparing the pros and cons of the products that compete against
payday loans. For example, comparing a depository bank’s overdraft product to
a payday loan requires considerable sophistication. The customer would need a
good estimate of the number of checks he would be likely to bounce, as well
as a good way of aggregating overdraft fees and discounting them to an interest
rate that he could compare to the effective interest rate on a payday product.
Because the effective rates in both cases really would depend on accurate forecasts of the customer’s use of the products in the future, even accurate disclosures
of the applicable fee structures would not make that task easy.132
Moreover, even for the customers focused on comparing alternative payday
lending products, there is little reason to be sanguine about the robustness of
competitive forces. Research indicates that payday lenders almost uniformly
133
Nothing suggests
charge the highest rate permissible in their jurisdiction.
price collusion or monopolistic concentrations within the market,134 but several
other factors likely account for the lack of price competition. For starters, the
disclosures that the Truth in Lending Act requires in this market operate
principally to confuse consumers and aggravate the difficulties of comparison
shopping, a point we discuss in more detail below.135 It also is true that borrowers
131.
See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006).
132.
But see BAIR, supra note 23, at 29 (concluding that payday customers do compare costs between
payday loans and overdraft fees based on evidence that customers use payday loans to avoid overdrafting
their accounts).
133.
See Chessin, supra note 17, at 409 (presenting evidence that about 90 percent of lenders in
Colorado charge the statutory maximum rate); Chin, supra note 70, at 741 (“In states where the interest
rate cap was relaxed to encourage competition, the price of small loans did not go down, as predicted by
fair market proponents. Instead, rates clustered at the cap set by state legislatures.”).
134.
BAIR, supra note 23, at 29.
135.
See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text.
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that require money immediately may have a limited taste for price shopping.136
This problem is exacerbated by the small size of the loans, which makes the
gains from even a major price difference quite small as an absolute matter.137
The third and perhaps most serious competitive problem comes from the
market structure. As discussed above, it is widely thought—at least by the large
national providers—that location is of paramount importance.138 Thus, the retail
store that is most conveniently located for a particular customer based on her
residential and commuting patterns has a strong advantage over all other stores.
Moreover, because the profitability of an individual location depends on building
a relatively large portfolio of transactions and customers, there is a natural
limit on the density with which profitable locations can be established. That limit
well might hinder the effectiveness of price competition. On the other hand, the
apparent clustering of payday lending stores in suitable neighborhoods suggests
that this problem can be overstated.
For some, the failure of market forces to drive prices to a competitive level
would be an adequate basis for governmental intervention. The basic argument, articulated most effectively by Stewart Macaulay and Art Leff, and
previously applied by one of us to the credit card market,139 is that a government
inappropriately cedes regulatory power to a private enterprise when it allows
businesses to define the terms of commerce in industries in which competitive
forces do not constrain the terms.
For others, however, the patent futility of crafting regulatory solutions to
all instances of market failure will make it important to identify some harm
to be addressed. In the consumer-credit area, the harm comes from the financial distress that attends poor decisionmaking by customers in the market.140
136.
BAIR, supra note 23, at 29.
137.
John Pottow suggests an apt analogy to tipping on small checks, where many of us routinely
round up to the nearest dollar, even if it results in a percentage tip that is far beyond our normal
practices on substantial purchases. Interview with John Pottow (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
138.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 10. See, e.g., ACE Cash Express, Inc., supra note 20,
at 17 (“We believe that the principal competitive factors in the check cashing and short-term consumer
loan (also known as payday loan) industry are location, customer service, fees, convenience, range
of services offered, speed and confidentiality.”); First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12, at 3
(“Management seeks to locate new stores where demographics are favorable and competition is
limited.”); id. at 7 (“The Company believes that the primary elements of competition in these businesses
are store location . . . .”); QC Holdings, Inc., supra note 15, at 8 (“We believe that the primary
competitive factors in the payday loan industry are store location and customer service.”).
139.
See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006) (discussing
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966), and Arthur Alan Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144 (1970)).
140.
This paragraph summarizes an argument made in more detail in chapter 5 of RONALD J.
MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 60–72 (2006).

884

54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 855 (2007)

Specifically, there is good reason to think that financial distress generates costs
for society as a whole that are not borne by the parties to the transaction. Thus,
the loss from financial distress does not end when a single creditor fails to obtain
repayment from the loan that it has advanced. Rather, financial distress has a
series of broader effects. It increases the burden on the social safety net: Those
in distress are unlikely to contribute funds to support the social safety net, but
are quite likely to draw on the resources others have contributed. This is
particularly true if financial distress leads to illness; some data, principally in
work by Melissa Jacoby,141 suggests such a link. Those in financial distress
are likely to have trouble finding gainful employment, which means that the rest
of society will not receive the positive spillover effects that would otherwise
accrue from the exercise of their human capital. Finally, financial distress is
likely to impose costs on dependent family members.
In sum, the best case against payday lending is that the market is
plagued by cognitive failures, unlikely to be well policed by competitive forces,
and likely to generate external costs borne by the rest of society. It is simply
not plausible, the argument goes, that a person of ordinary capacity would
sensibly decide to borrow money at a rate of 400 percent, using a loan that, in
most cases, is likely to remain outstanding for months, if not years. In assessing
the weight of this problem, it bears noting that those who will be harmed by the
market failure are systematically likely to be far from the top of the distribution of
income and wealth.
2.

The Case in Favor of Payday Lending

As the discussion in Part I suggests, a majority of American jurisdictions
in recent years have adopted legislation that specifically authorizes payday
lending. It would be naive to suppose that the legislators that voted for those
bills carefully evaluated the relevant social interests. Nevertheless, several
arguments support the legislation, three of which seem substantial: the benefits
of permitting lending; the relatively weak link between lending and financial
distress; and the likelihood that a ban on payday lending will lead borrowers to
shift to credit products that are relatively worse for borrowers who would
otherwise use payday loans.

141.
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 560 (2002)
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The Benefits of Allowing Payday Lending

The first point is simple, reflecting a general suspicion of wholly paternalist
intervention in consumer-credit markets. The one thing that we know for
sure about payday lending is that it is attractive to a large number of consumers
in the Western economies that tolerate it. The product’s rapid growth is not
limited to the United States, but is apparent in Australia, Canada, and the
142
United Kingdom as well. Moreover, because the overwhelming majority of
payday lending transactions do not result in default on the part of the borrower,
there is some reason to think that many of the transactions benefit both the
borrower and the lender.
It is easy for upper-middle-class academics that study the topic to think
that this lending is unduly risky and that those that engage in it would be better
advised to tighten their belts and resist the temptation to borrow. It will be
much less clear to the borrower—almost by definition a person struggling to
make it from paycheck to paycheck—that the transaction involves a luxurious
excess. We of course know very little about exactly what the customers of
payday lenders do with the funds that they borrow. Surely some of them use
the funds on vicious habits that reflect poor choices, but just as surely at least
some of the borrowers are responsible individuals using the funds to purchase
food or medicine.143
b.

Payday Lending and Financial Distress

The second point in favor of payday lending focuses on a weak link in the
discussion in Part II.A.1, which assumes that toleration of the payday lending
market substantially increases the incidence of financial distress. Although
there must be some transactions in which the additional funds available from a
payday lender tip the scale toward insolvency, these small loans probably do
not contribute substantially to financial distress and insolvency. A comparison

142.
The first payday lender in Australia appeared in 1998, and by 2001, eighty-two
payday lending businesses were offering 12,800 loans a month. WILSON, supra note 46, at 34. Though
currently a small industry, experts predict it will grow along the same lines as in the United States. Id. at
11. In Canada, one survey reports that nearly a million Canadians, about one in every thirty-two
people, have used a payday loan at least once. Richard Brennan, Nicole MacIntyre & Jim Rankin,
Ontario Has Begun Payday Lender Probe: Loan Industry Is Unregulated, TORONTO STAR, June 22, 2004,
at A17. There are more than 1200 payday lending stores in Canada, and reports estimate that payday
lending generates more than a billion dollars a year in revenue. See Rankin & MacIntyre, supra note
115, at A1; ACORN CANADA, PROTECTING CANADIANS’ INTEREST: REINING IN THE PAYDAY
LENDING INDUSTRY 2 (2004).
143.
See supra note 6 (discussing the available evidence).
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to the credit card market—where the relationship between card use and financial
distress is pronounced—is illuminating.
First, unlike credit card lending, payday lending has a limited potential to
spiral into escalating levels of borrowing. Thus, we would not expect to see files
of bankrupt borrowers with tens of thousands of dollars of claims from payday
lenders. Credit card lenders often hold claims of that size, but payday loans, by
the nature of the business, are self-limiting: They are not going to grow to an
amount that equals the expected take-home pay from the borrower’s next
paycheck. Indeed, in most of the jurisdictions that have adopted authorizing
statutes, the statutes include a specific maximum cap—like the $600 cap in the
Michigan statute.144 When coupled with a reliable database of all providers,145
these provisions should prevent payday lending from contributing to the spiral
of ever-increasing indebtedness that is such a major part of the problem with
credit card debt.
Thus, one way to think about the payday loan is that it is, at worst, a
second, relatively small unsecured line of credit available to borrowers after they
have maxed out their credit cards. Perhaps the availability of this line will lead
some borrowers to wait longer before they surrender to inevitable bankruptcy,
but that effect seems much less significant than the effect of the often much
larger credit card line behind which the payday lender will come. Indeed, it is
possible that the payday loan could even help speed the bankruptcy filing,
because the borrower could use a payday loan to borrow the funds needed to file
for bankruptcy.
c.

Forcing Borrowers Into Worse Markets

The most important justification for the payday lending market concerns
the secondary effects of bans on payday lending. The point of such bans is to
keep consumers from borrowing funds because of insufficient financial planning.
The core problem, however, is that bans are unlikely to keep consumers from
borrowing. Rather, the evidence suggests that bans may well cause consumers to
borrow from sources that provide products that are less beneficial—products that
consumers are more likely to avoid in markets that tolerate payday lending.
We start from the premise that the desire of consumers to borrow is to a
large degree a function of economic development.146 Governments can take
144.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2153(1) (West Supp. 2006).
145.
For discussion of such databases, see infra text accompanying note 210.
146.
MANN, supra note 140, at 106–18. This might be because economic development is associated
with the development of an enforcement infrastructure that fosters credit markets. See Simeon Djankov et
al., Debt Enforcement Around the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12807, 2006).
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steps to ensure that the credit is made available in ways that benefit society as
much as possible and harm those that use the credit as little as possible.147 But
it is, generally speaking, quite difficult to prevent consumers from borrowing by
eliminating a particular method of extending credit. Thus, for example, the
effect of Japan’s longstanding ban on credit card lending by banks was not to
bolster the frugality of the Japanese populace. Rather, it was to enhance the
market share of Japanese consumer lending held by relatively unsavory nonbank
lenders.148 More broadly, a recent study by the United Kingdom’s Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) bolsters this intuition with its finding that consumer
demand for borrowing in countries with usury ceilings was the same as demand
in countries without ceilings: The same number of people required credit, and
people generally had the same aggregate level of debt-service-to-income ratios.149
As the example of New York discussed above illustrates, it is far too simple
to suggest that usury regulation can never drive out high-cost borrowing. It is
true, however, that it requires two things that few jurisdictions have: both a broad
and inclusive usury statute (so that lenders cannot easily switch to substitute
transactions that are unregulated), and an aggressive enforcement regime (so that
lenders cannot operate unlawfully below the radar).150
Working from the premise that risky lending will not be eradicated in
many jurisdictions, the natural question is where consumers are going to get the
funds if they can not get them from payday lenders. Echoing a prominent
Australian commentator, some might say that “the risk of borrowers turning to
Economic development also might be associated with long-term political stability necessary to foster
credit markets. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV.
460 (2006). Our thoughts on that debate are beyond the scope of this Article.
147.
The Talent-Nelson Amendment is a good example. John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364 § 670, 120 Stat. 2083 (to be codified at 49
U.S.C. § 987). The military would take away the product that the military personnel are using
without either addressing the conditions that make the product attractive or facilitating a more
reasonably priced alternative. The 36-percent rate caps likely will make the national chains inaccessible
to military families. We can expect to see those families depending more heavily on subprime credit
cards, pawn shops, rent-to-own providers, and unlicensed payday lenders, all of which in the long run
are likely to be worse for those families than the prohibited payday loans. Interviews with
representatives of large payday lending firms suggest that military personnel are only about 1 percent
of their customers and that those personnel (and their dependents) will be immediately excluded from
their customer base. Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
148.
MANN, supra note 140, at 106–18; Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the
United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2002).
149.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 10, 12. Economists also have suggested that the demand for
credit by high-risk borrowers is relatively inelastic. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth
of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behaviorism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 1481, 1497 (2006) (discussing theories of Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss).
150.
As we discuss in the concluding pages of this Article, sensibly chosen usury limits can serve
another function: to segment the market between legitimate providers (that can profit from lawful
transactions) and less efficient illegitimate providers (who are priced out of the market by the usury limit).
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less reputable fringe credit providers does not seem enough to justify the
continuation of current practices in the payday lending industry.”151 In our
view, however, a fair look at the evidence makes that conclusion fairly debatable.
To us, the evidence makes it at least possible that the consumers that have
made payday lenders so profitable have done so for one general and rational
reason: The products of payday lenders provide a better mix of benefits and
risks than the competing products consumers would choose if payday lenders
were banned. The most persuasive source here is the DTI report, which
concludes a survey of European and American markets with this view: “Where
low-income borrowers have more than one credit option, consumers’ choices
in relation to lending models appears [sic] rational on both cost and utility
grounds.”152 Though scholars in many jurisdictions—Canada,153 Australia,154
and of course the United States155—often assert that low-income borrowers
act irrationally when they use payday loans, they have not provided evidence
to support those assertions. A quick glance at five of the leading alternatives to
payday lending shows the sense in Jim White’s perspective: “I think even the
poorest consumers are quite savvy. They understand the alternatives and make
choices about borrowing that are wise for them even when the decisions seem
foolish or wasteful to middle-class observers.”156
(1)

Banks

An effective attempt to ban payday lending might be successful if banks
were to take the place of fringe payday lenders that currently provide credit
to subprime borrowers. Michael Barr has made sound recommendations for
products that banks could offer to compete with payday lenders.157 And Sheila
Bair’s recent extensive report on the potential role of banks in payday lending
(Bair Report) provides a thoughtful and promising analysis of several business
158
models that banks might use to operate profitably in this market. We remain
skeptical, however, that banks could fill the place of payday lenders without
substantially duplicating the product payday lenders offer.

151.
Wilson, supra note 2, at 165.
152.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
153.
RAMSAY, supra note 46, at iii, 24.
154.
Wilson, supra note 2, at 163.
155.
See Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1582 (assuming consumers are irrational because they use
payday loans over longer periods).
156.
White, supra note 110, at 466.
157.
Barr, supra note 2, at 163–64.
158.
BAIR, supra note 23, at 34–37.
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For one thing, history suggests that banks will not operate in these markets
unless they are permitted to charge higher rates. For example, before consumer
credit was deregulated in the United States, banks would not make small,
unsecured, high-risk loans to borrowers because of the high transaction costs
associated with such loans.159 In Germany’s and France’s strict rate-cap
environments, high-risk borrowers are simply excluded from accessing credit;
banks do not fill in the gap left by payday lenders.160
To be sure, as the Bair Report discusses, there have been numerous
policy initiatives in this country designed to support active participation by
depository institutions.161 But for the most part, the low-rate programs that the
Bair Report discusses (involving rates in the range of 12 to 20 percent per annum)
are not profitable.162 Those we have spoken to in the industry assert with great
confidence that banks will profit from a payday lending product that undercuts
the existing market only by hiding back-end fees or tying the product to
some other service on which the banks profit substantially.163 At the core,
the problem is that the payday lending product competes directly with the
164
overdraft product, and banks that wish to market the overdraft will not want
to offer unprofitable or break-even, short-term lending products.165
Moreover, borrowers likely have little to gain by shifting to the overdraft
product. The overdraft is characterized by cascading fees—a fee in the range of
$20 to $30 for each check that the customer bounces each month.166 The payday
product, by contrast, contemplates a single fee, in the same range, that covers
an advance for the entire remainder of the payroll period. Upon payment of
that single fee, the customer can use the funds to pay each of the obligations that
would have resulted in separate overdraft fees. Admittedly, the interest rates
on the payday lending product are high. But the product has two advantages
over the overdraft product. First, and most importantly, it seems fairly clear
that overdraft products are more expensive than payday lending products.
They often escape criticism largely because existing regulations in this country
159.
Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1569–70.
160.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
161.
BAIR, supra note 23, at 21–28.
162.
For instance, neither the Windward Community Federal Credit Union’s product, which has
a 12 percent APR, nor the North Side Community Federal Credit Union’s product, which has a 16.5
percent APR, are profitable. Id. at 22–23, 26. For discussion of a more recent credit-union effort, see
Katie Kuehner-Hebert, CUs in Ohio Team Up to Offer Payday Alternative, AM. BANKER, July 13, 2006.
163.
Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
164.
See Barr, supra note 2, at 163–64.
165.
BAIR, supra note 23, at 34 (“Why offer a small dollar line of credit linked to a checking account
at an 18% APR if a bank can collect many multiples of that by assessing a $17 to $35 fee each time a
customer overdraws his/her account?”).
166.
Id. at 10–13.
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treat those products as if they do not involve credit,167 even when they are
marketed in a way that contemplates regular advances. Second, and relatedly,
the payday lending product is relatively transparent (especially as we envision it
in the discussion below), with a price that is simple for customers to understand.
The overdraft product, by contrast, is much harder for customers to price, if
only because it frequently will be difficult for them to predict when they are
issuing checks that will bounce.
Because all payday lending customers have some bank account—an
account on which their repayment check must be drawn—there is certainly the
potential for bank competition. In the end, however, the message we take from
the Bair Report is that banks that work very hard on this problem with the
help of regulators might develop the ability to serve with profit some small
number of the less troubled customers of payday lenders. In reality, regulators
are not comfortable that they adequately can supervise the extremely highvolume, low-amount lending transactions in which sophisticated payday lenders
engage. Moreover, the costs of branch banking are likely to make it hard for
banks to compete directly against the most sophisticated payday lenders,
which will be able to establish highly dispersed retail locations more cheaply
than banks.
(2)

Subprime Credit Cards

Another obvious alternative to payday lending is the subprime credit card.
If payday loans were banned, at least some payday lending customers could shift
to subprime credit card products. This is perhaps the most perverse outcome. If
forcing customers to overdrafts is bad because they are expensive and opaque,
shifting consumers to credit cards is much worse.168 Also, as discussed above, it
appears that many payday lending customers are already using credit cards to
their fullest extent. Thus, it seems unlikely that a ban on payday lending would
result in a shift to credit card lending. Rather, it would result in a shift to the
less appealing products discussed in the three Subparts that follow.

167.
Both the Bair Report and Michael Barr note that banks benefit from the fact that overdraft
fees are not subject to the TILA’s requirement of disclosing the APR because consumers do not
appreciate the relative costs of this form of credit. Id. at 34; Barr, supra note 2, at 164. Consumer
advocates are pressing for an amendment to Regulation Z that would apply the TILA to bouncedcheck-protection programs. See Mark E. Budnitz, Developments in Payment Systems Law, 10 J. OF
CONSUMER & COM. L. 5 (2006).
168.
See generally MANN, supra note 140, at 45–72.
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Pawnshops

In our view, one of the first places consumers would turn to if payday loans
169
Pawnshops operate by giving
were not available would be pawnshops.
consumers a loan in exchange for a possessory interest in a piece of personal
property. The interest becomes an ownership interest after a specified period if
the consumer is unable to repay the principal and interest on the loan. John
Caskey’s classic and comprehensive 1994 study of pawnshops details the boom
in pawnshops during the 1970s and 1980s.170 Caskey found that borrowers use
pawnshops when they have no other alternative source of credit.171
The product bears the obvious disadvantage, as compared to the payday
loan, that an adverse financial outcome results in the direct and permanent loss
of personal property of the consumer.172 Moreover, because consumers typically
have no right to the surplus from the sale of repossessed property, the ultimate
costs are likely to be considerably more than the stated interest rate would
suggest.173 In a normal secured loan, a secured creditor can sell the collateral if
174
the debtor defaults on the loan. If the sale generates more money than the
amount of the debt, however, the creditor must return the excess to the borrower.175 In a pawn transaction, the borrower pledges a piece of property in
exchange for money, but the borrower is never obligated to redeem the
property176 and cannot be held liable for the debt.177 But if the borrower does
not redeem the pledge by paying back the loan and fees, the property is simply

169.
There is some debate about whether payday lenders and pawnshops serve the same
constituency. Dean Wilson argues that, in Australia, pawnbrokers and payday lenders do not serve
the same consumers, because only 15 percent of people taking out payday loans had used pawnbroker
in last 12 months. WILSON, supra note 46, at 68. If that pattern is true here, it would suggest that the
regular customers of pawnbrokers are a step farther along the path to financial distress than the regular
customers of payday lenders.
170.
JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE
POOR 84–110 (1994).
171.
Id. at 78.
172.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 102. John Caskey also notes that involving property in the
transaction makes the transaction less convenient for borrowers. CASKEY, supra note 170, at 68.
173.
Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury
Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 600 (2000). Caskey reports that “[n]onredemption rates
of 10–30% are typical in the states for which there are data.” CASKEY, supra note 170, at 41.
174.
U.C.C. § 9-601 (1999).
175.
Id. § 9-608(b).
176.
See, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 371.170 (Vernon 2006) (“A pledgor is not obligated to
redeem pledged goods or to make a payment on a pawn transaction.”).
177.
See, e.g., id. § 371.171 (“A pawnbroker may not enter an agreement requiring the personal
liability of the pledgor in connection with a pawn transaction.”).
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forfeited to the pawnbroker,178 and the borrower has no right to any surplus
value the pawnbroker acquires through the borrower’s forfeiture. Given the
likelihood in most cases (at least in the United States) that the property would
be exempt from execution, the lost property would have been protected even in
the event of a bankruptcy proceeding, if only the consumer could have borrowed
funds from an unsecured lender like a payday lender.
There is some reason to think that consumers recognize these problems.
Thus, the DTI report summarizes evidence that U.S. consumers choose payday
lending over pawnbrokers precisely because payday loans do not require surrendering assets.179 A similar distaste for pawnshops apparently exists in the United
Kingdom,180 although it is “doorstep” lending, rather than payday lending, that is
181
the fringe-lending product of choice.
Nor is there much reason to think that consumers would benefit from lower
interest rates if they used pawnbrokers. Loans made by pawnbrokers generally
have interest rates at least as high as, if not higher than, payday loans. For
instance, title loans, a form of pawnbroking in which consumers give a security
interest in their cars to the pawnbrokers in exchange for a loan, can have annual
percentage rates (APRs) of almost 1000 percent.182 There also is evidence that
pawnshops fail to solve the problem of habitual borrowing, as Caskey found
that 70 to 80 percent of pawnbrokers’ business was repeat customers.183
There is also a general sense that the step from the payday lending market
to the pawnbroker market is a step toward a less reputable lender. Publicly held
companies operate fewer than 6 percent of the pawnshops in the United States,184
whereas an increasing share of payday lending locations are operated by a group
178.
See, e.g., id. § 371.169(c) (“Pledged goods not redeemed on or before the 30th day after the
original maturity date may, at the option of the pawnbroker, be forfeited to the pawnbroker.”).
179.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
180.
Id. at 20.
181.
The “doorstop” lending market generally involves small, short-term loans (like payday loans),
but it emphasizes door-to-door solicitation and collection. See Doorstep Lenders “Overcharging”, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4949544.stm. For discussion of that market, see
the Competition Commission’s website regarding an inquiry into anticompetitive practices. Competition
Commission, Welcome to the Home-Page of the Home Credit Inquiry, http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/inquiries/current/homecredit/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
182.
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 173, at 598–99. Of course, just as with payday lending, it may
well be that a focus on the nominal interest rate is misleading. To a pawnshop customer, what is important
is the customer’s personal valuation of the goods being pawned, and the customer surely understands
that the goods will be lost unless the customer can repay the loan.
183.
CASKEY, supra note 170, at 42. On the other hand, pawnshop lending bears the advantage
(compared to payday lending) that the product is less likely to enmesh the borrower in the long
string of repetitive interest payments for the same loan; if the borrower can not redeem the pawn,
it will lose the pawn, but it will not continue rolling the loan over until it has paid the amount of the
obligation several times over.
184.
White, supra note 110, at 458–59.
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of large publicly traded companies.185 At least in the United States, this is
associated with a stigma against pawn shops: “[T]he [pawnbroking] industry has
difficulty shaking the ‘pawnbroker stigma.’ The composite image of the
pawnbroker is that of a shady, unkempt, over-weight character working out of
a filthy, run-down, back street hock shop . . . providing continuing support to
‘druggies’ and other ‘low lifes’ in exchange for pawns of stolen goods.”186
(4)

Rent-to-Own

In rent-to-own (RTO) transactions, consumers acquire goods, such as
televisions or furniture, in exchange for periodic payments. Consumers make
either weekly or monthly payments to the renting party. If the consumer
cannot make the payment, the consumer must return the goods.187 Eventually,
188
the consumer owns the goods after paying for a specified period. The RTO
industry is “a $4.5 billion industry of approximately 7,500 stores with about
3.5 million customers.”189 RTO lenders appear to compete directly with payday
lenders. As the DTI report cogently notes, the relation between RTO transactions and payday loan regulation is demonstrated by the facts that RTO
transactions are permitted in most U.S. states but are concentrated in states
with the fewest other credit options for lower-income individuals190 and are
191
stronger in states with interest-rate ceilings.
The consumer preference for payday loans over RTO transactions is quite
sensible. For one thing, RTO transactions are not governed by the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.192 RTO transactions functionally require consumers to
pay very high interest rates to obtain goods, such as, in one example, paying
$1709 to obtain a 20-inch television with a retail price of under $300.193 RTO
194
transactions have the undisclosed processing fees of payday loans and the

185.
Id. at 459.
186.
Jarret C. Oeltjen, Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in Transition, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995,
995 (1996). Survey evidence from Australia suggests a similar perspective. Thus, Australians report
that they prefer payday loans over pawn transactions because pawnbrokers are less professional than
payday lenders, and because going to a pawnshop reveals a greater admission of desperation or is
more demeaning. WILSON, supra note 46, at 79.
187.
For a comprehensive discussion, see Martin & Huckins, supra note 2.
188.
Id. at 385.
189.
Id.
190.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
191.
Id. at 13. For a detailed account of state laws on rent-to-own transactions, see Martin &
Huckins, supra note 2, at 396–400.
192.
Martin & Huckins, supra note 2, at 391.
193.
Id. at 401.
194.
Id. at 403–04.
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behavior-driven late fees of credit cards.195 RTO dealers list retail prices of their
goods much higher than the market value of the goods to confuse consumers.196
Therefore, RTO transactions not only have the adverse effects of pawnshop
lending (customers lose their property), but they also have much less transparent
pricing to the customer (because of the long sequence of payments required to
purchase). Indeed, RTOs might be the worst product for consumers, pairing a
risk of forfeiture for nonpayment with the most serious cognitive problems.
(5)

Illegal Sources

Finally, when borrowers have no other legal credit options, they will seek
illegal credit options. For instance, evidence confirms that loan sharks remain
common in Australia.197 Responsible Australian policymakers, like then minister
of fair trading Judy Spence, have claimed that banning payday lending would
lead directly to individuals with low incomes patronizing loan sharks.198 The
DTI’s arguably self-interested take on illegal lending in the United Kingdom
versus illegal lending in France and Germany suggests a similar relation: “The
credit impaired in France and Germany appear more likely to use illegal lenders
199
than in the U.K. where there are legal credit options for such borrowers.”
Thus, the DTI reports, 3 percent of UK borrowers admit to using illegal lenders,
as opposed to 7 percent in France and 8 percent in Germany.200 Comparing
people who have been denied a loan reveals an even greater difference, with
4 percent in the United Kingdom admitting using illegal lenders, contrasted
with 12 percent in France and 10 percent in Germany.201 If we assume that
illegal sources of credit and the extralegal collection methods on which they rely
are disadvantageous as compared to legal sources, then we should worry about
legal rules that will expand the market share for the illegal products.
***

195.
Id. at 403–04.
196.
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 173, at 615–16.
197.
Wilson, supra note 2, at 165.
198.
Id. at 165 (citing Press Release, Australian Office of Fair Trading, Payday Predators Panned
(Aug. 31, 2000)).
199.
DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 44.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. For more detailed survey research on that topic, see POLICIS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RISKS OF CONSUMER CREDIT MARKET REGULATION (2006), available at http://www.policis.com/
financial_services_market_regulation.htm.
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We are largely agnostic about the merits of the arguments presented
above. In our view, the discussion about these arguments is important because
policymakers deciding whether to authorize payday lending should start by
deciding exactly why they do—or do not—think it contributes to the welfare of
their constituents. Those for whom the arguments in favor of payday lending
are not persuasive should be reluctant to support the spread of payday lending in
their jurisdiction. Those who (like most legislators in this country) cannot
justify a complete ban on payday lending should read on to consider precisely
what type of lending they should tolerate.
B.

Should Repetitive Payday Lending Be Banned?

A distinct question is whether habitual use of payday loans should be
tolerated. As discussed in Part I, it is clear that rollover payday loans are
common in the industry. Indeed, the Flannery and Samolyk study contemplates
that the profitability of the large national providers might depend on rollover
payday loans.202 In some cases, the results can be startling. For example, one
recent enforcement action targeted an illegal series of rollovers in which one
borrower paid over $19,500 in interest over eight years on a series of loans that
eventually reached a principal balance of $1875.203 This raises the prospect of
an intermediate policy perspective: A state might tolerate payday loans in the
abstract, but prohibit rollover loans. Indeed, this is not a hypothetical perspective. Most of the states that have adopted legislation authorizing payday loans
have modified the model CFSA statute in ways designed to make rollover
lending more difficult. Unfortunately, as we discuss below, it appears that
none of the statutes that prohibit rollover loans has been drafted in a way
effective to prevent customers from becoming trapped in an indefinite cycle of
payday borrowing.
Whether a prohibition on rollover loans makes sense depends, in part,
on whether such a ban would effectively abolish the payday lending market
altogether. If a ban on rollover loans would effectively ban the market entirely,
or drive all reputable providers from the market, which is much the same
thing from a policy perspective, then a policymaker contemplating a ban on
rollover loans should consider its goals.

202.
For our discussion of why rollovers play an important role in lender profitability, see supra
notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
203.
See Press Release, Wash. State Dep’t of Fin. Insts., DFI Bans Payday Lender from the Industry
and Orders Restitution to Consumers (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumers/
news/2006/expressit.htm.
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Many commentators—and a good number of legislators—operate on the
assumption that proof that a substantial number of payday loan customers are
frequent users self-evidently demonstrates the impropriety of the business.
The argument often proceeds as follows: An example is given of a small loan
that a customer has rolled over month after month, resulting in the customer
having paid hundreds of dollars in interest but never having paid down the
204
principal. From this example, we are to conclude rollovers are illegitimate.
Yet the policy basis for that perspective is difficult to articulate. For one
thing, if the total amount of funds extended by the payday lender is capped,205
it is difficult to understand why it would matter that the borrower might
borrow repeatedly from the same (or a different) lender. At worst, this indicates
that the borrower’s overall debt has increased, more or less permanently,
by the total amount available from a payday lender. Even in the most
dramatic examples—in which a customer pays $1000 to maintain a $150
debt over a period of eighteen months—the customer’s level of debt never
increases beyond $150.206
A comparison to credit card borrowing is illustrative. It seems unlikely that
many people that borrow up to twice their annual income on credit cards
ultimately pay off the entire amount of the indebtedness without suffering from
the effects of financial distress. With payday loans, however, if the maximum
borrowing is capped at something less than a twelfth or a twenty-fourth part
of annual income, it seems at first glance much less problematic than credit
card borrowing.
The high interest rates of payday loans, however, can produce shocking
outcomes like the one discussed above—a loan at the standard $15 rate rolled
over for eighteen months. Can we really believe that the customer is better off
with that product than he would have been if he had paid $5 or $10 extra every
two weeks to amortize the loan balance slightly?
Moreover, the structure of the product leads to all-or-nothing transactions: payoff followed by rollover. Thus, as a matter of framing, the borrower
each week faces a choice between paying $30 to keep the loan for another
204.
See, e.g., Chin, supra note 70, at 729 (citing the following example: “[A]fter borrowing
$150, and paying $1000 in fees for six months, a Kentucky borrower still owes the $150”).
205.
This is true both as a matter of the economics of the product and as a feature of the regulatory
regime. For instance, even under the model legislation that the CFSA supports, loan amounts are
capped at $500. Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 79, § 6(1) at 35.
206.
Thirty dollars for each of the thirty-six rollover periods would amount to $1080. This assumes
that the borrower is dealing with a reputable provider that charges no back-end fees of any kind.
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two weeks or paying $230 to repay the loan all at once. If the borrower
looks each week at the $30, the borrower will pay inadequate attention to
the long-term outcome: $1080 in interest paid for an eighteen-month loan
of $200.
The framing problem also creates perverse incentives for lenders. In a
market in which generating a reliable income stream is the goal, the lender can
be less concerned with monitoring the likelihood of repayment than with the
likelihood of a paycheck that promises the capacity to make a continuing stream
of rollover payments. It may be a different mechanism than the more familiar
model of the credit card issuer, but the outcome is much the same; the principal
difference is that the payday lender need invest only $200 to generate $60 per
month, while the credit card issuer will need to invest $3000.207
In the end, the case for banning rollover loans comes down to the policy
implications of the deeply repetitive borrower discussed above. Is it tolerable for
borrowers to pay the fees of the payday product without any limitation? Even
legislators immune from paternalistic impulses are likely to insist upon some
limit on rollover loans. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the model deferred
deposit loan act promulgated by the CFSA bans more than one direct repeated
rollover loan.208
2.

The Mechanics of Banning Repetitive Lending

Turning to the policy choices of current legislators, a rollover ban is the
response of choice among states. The great majority of those states that regulate
payday lending have adopted rules that limit repetitive lending by limiting or
preventing direct rollover loans.209 The problem, however, is that a limitation
on rollover loans requires two additional features if it is to have any effect on
repetitive borrowing.
First, a state must maintain a database of all licensed providers, require
lenders to consult that database before making loans, and make prohibitions on
repetitive lending applicable to the entire pool of licensees. Without such
207.
Assuming monthly payments of about 2 percent of the outstanding balance.
208.
See Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 79, § 8 at 36. Of course, that ban is written in a
way that is practically ineffective. But it is relevant to us that that even the CFSA is unwilling to publicly
defend indefinite rollover lending.
209.
Rollover bans are part of the regimes in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. PayDay Loan Consumer Information, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/states.cfm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2007).
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a database, the borrower that wishes to borrow repetitively need only cycle its
borrowings between more than one lender, just as a distressed consumer need
only use cash advances on one credit card to make a minimum payment
required to keep a second card active. These databases are increasingly
common—Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, and North Dakota all have
implemented them in the last few years.210
The second necessary feature is an effective cooling-off period between
211
loans. These periods exist in a number of states, with periods ranging from one
to seven days,212 typically imposed after a long string of borrowing. Indiana’s
213
provision (the most restrictive), requires a seven-day cooling-off period after six
consecutive transactions. As far as we can tell, however, only Indiana has
both a cooling-off period and a limit on repetitive lending that is policed by
reference to a statewide database. This, then, is the closest any state has
come to enacting an effective ban on repetitive payday lending. And even
there, a reasonable skeptic might say that the cooling-off period is too short to be
effective. No period less than fourteen days will ensure that a typical borrower
with a two-week pay cycle is forced to go through an entire cycle without
obtaining funds from a payday lender.
In sum, most legislatures have determined that the best outcome is some
form of an intermediate policy: restricting or prohibiting the kinds of repetitive
payday lending transactions that indicate that a customer is irretrievably
enmeshed with payday loans. But few (perhaps none) of the legislatures that
have taken that policy view have adopted a system that is likely to eliminate
repetitive payday borrowing.

210.
Id. For a typical statute, see FLA. STAT. § 560.404(18)–(19) (2003).
211.
The CFSA’s model statute includes a ban on rollover loans, but includes neither a statewide
database nor a cooling-off period. See Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 79, § 8 at 36.
212.
Cooling-off periods are part of the regimes in Alabama (one day), Illinois (seven days),
Indiana (seven days), North Dakota (three days), and Oregon (one day). See also, e.g., Johnson, supra
note 2, at 66 (“[I]n Iowa and other states that prohibit rollovers but allow a customer to have two loans
with the same lender, lenders could claim technical compliance with the state law prohibition against
rollovers while allowing consumers to continually roll an existing loan into a new loan as long as
the lender does not exceed the maximum loan amount. This possible end-run around the rollover
prohibition prompted the Iowa Division of Banking to issue an interpretive bulletin informing
lenders that the prohibition on rollovers means that they cannot issue a new loan to a consumer
until at least one day after payment of the previous loan . . . . Unlike Iowa, other states have not even
tried to clarify the interrelationship between statutes that prohibit rollovers and statutes that allow
multiple outstanding loans. Therefore, payday lenders in these states may practice rollovers even where
it is technically illegal.”) (footnotes omitted); PayDay Loan Consumer Information, supra note 209.
213.
IND. CODE § 24-4.5-7-108, -404 (2006).
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How to Design Regulatory Schemes That Target Abuse

Finally, we consider the view that the payday lending model should be
permitted to function without substantial constraint to the product itself.
That does not suggest, however, that the industry should be immune from
regulation. As discussed above, no U.S. jurisdiction has adopted that perspective. The task, rather, is to define the purpose of these regulatory schemes, as a
precursor to assessing how well they work.
In general, the two most obvious bases for regulation in a jurisdiction that
wishes to allow payday lending would be (1) to limit the cognitive problems
discussed above; and (2) to limit the likelihood of abusive conduct by lenders.
Thus, the discussion above presents the view that payday lending might be
permitted because, in the range of prices and attributes at which the product
typically is offered, the product is attractive to even well-informed customers,
particularly when it is compared to high-cost alternatives like overdraft
products and risky products like credit cards, pawnshop lending, and RTO
transactions. At the same time, even in the jurisdictions that regulate the
market, it is hard to deny that transactions occur on terms outside those normal
parameters.214 This might be because the lenders charge fees that differ from
those that they disclose. Or it might be because the lenders charge fees that
grossly exceed the specified limits—fees far beyond the amounts necessary for a
well-organized business to profit. Or it might be because the lenders package the
payday lending product with other related products for which they charge
unreasonable amounts, all with the purpose of charging unlawfully high fees.215
In general, it is safe to assume that some lenders engage in this conduct with an
intention to profit through avoidance of industry norms or legally prescribed
limits. The task, then, is to devise a regulatory regime that will allow legitimate
providers to proceed with as little burden as possible while hampering the
activities of those that currently operate with flagrant illegality.216
Logically, the first question in designing a scheme to limit abuse is whether
the abused customers can solve the problem themselves, simply by enforcing

214.
See, e.g., ConsumersUnion.org, Study: Payday Lenders Continue to Ignore State Laws
Related to Fees and Protections (July 2, 2003), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/
core_financial_services/000203.html (survey of thirty-one payday lenders in Texas indicating that none
were in compliance with applicable state law).
215.
This seems to have been the preferred practice of the “loan shark predator” discussed above.
See Escobedo, supra note 39.
216.
We do not address the problem of regulating Internet payday lending. Our impression is that
effective regulation of that sector will have to come first from the U.S. Congress. A good place to start,
however, would be to require that lenders provide a brick-and-mortar address of their headquarters.
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their rights through litigation.217 For several reasons, that seems implausible.
As Iain Ramsay points out in the Canadian context, “[t]he small amounts at
stake mean that few individuals are likely to litigate in the event of a dispute.”218
Even if attorneys were to work for free or operate under a fee-shifting
mechanism, the small damages involved might not deter lenders.219
Moreover, the nature of the customer base makes reliance on litigation
problematic. Lower-income people have fewer professional contacts, so it is
harder for them to enforce their rights.220 In Australia, commentary suggests that
“low-income consumers will not have the resources to apply to court to complain
of hardship or unconscionability.”221 Even if they had the resources to find
attorneys and pay court fees, studies show that “low-income consumers are
unlikely to take legal action in relation to a loan dispute, on the basis of factors
such as cost, a sense of powerlessness, and a fear of acrimonious disputes.”222
Thus, even recognizing that payday lending customers are not the poorest
segment of U.S. society, we remain skeptical that direct litigation alone will
allow victimized customers to enforce regular compliance with articulated
regulatory requirements.
Trying to fill the gap, we suggest a two-part approach. First, we suggest a
number of direct transactional regulations, many (but not all) of which appear
in one form or another in the deferred presentment statutes recommended by

217.
Other countries purport to regulate payday loans through judicial review. For example, the
British Consumer Credit Act empowers courts to lower interest rates that are unconscionable or
“extortionate and grossly exorbitant.” Consumer Credit Act, 1974, c. 14, § 39 (Eng.); Moneylenders Act,
63 & 64 Vict. 155, c. 51, § 1 (1900) (Eng.). Similarly, several Canadian provinces regulate excessive credit
charges and credit contracts by allowing courts to reopen consumer transactions that are unconscionable.
See, e.g., Alberta Unconscionable Transactions Act, R.S.A., ch. U-2, § 2 (2000) (empowering judges to
review and alter transactions in which “the cost of the loan is excessive and . . . the transaction is harsh and
unconscionable . . . .”); Manitoba Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.M., ch. U20, § 2 (1987)
(same); New Brunswick Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, R.S.N.B., ch. U-1, § 2 (1993) (same);
Newfoundland and Labrador Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. U-1, § 3
(1990) (same); Prince Edward Island Consumer Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. U-2, § 2 (1988) (same).
Also, some Canadian borrowers have sought judicial review of payday transactions—both individually
and through class actions. E.g., Affordable Payday Loans v. Beaudette, 2004 Carswell Ont. 3210, 2004
WL 1663120 (Ont. S.C.J.) (July 29, 2004); Jim Rankin, Borrow in Haste Repay Forever, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 21, 2005, at B03. The Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code similarly empowers
courts to review unconscionable interest rates and to reopen unjust transactions. UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE, 2001, §§ 70, 72 (Austl.).
218.
RAMSAY, supra note 46, at 18.
219.
Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1587.
220.
RAMSAY, supra note 46, at 19.
221.
Wilson, supra note 2, at 162.
222.
Id. at 163–64 (citing HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK
ABOUT GOING TO LAW 101 (1999)).
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the CFSA.223 Second, and of considerably more consequence, we consider
indirect actions to enhance the reliability of the industry by increasing the
participation of large and well-qualified lenders.
1.

Direct Regulation of the Transactions

Our proposal for direct regulation has two separate features: (1) transparency; and (2) disclosure. First, we would bar ancillary fees and sanctions in order
to simplify the fees and sanctions involved in the product and to enhance the
likelihood that competition will occur along a few dimensions that customers
more easily might understand.224 Second, we recommend focusing disclosures on
the amount of the fees. The existing interest-rate-based disclosures mandated
by the Truth in Lending Act are more likely to confuse than to illuminate.
a.

Transparency

One of the difficulties in regulating payday lenders has been the ability of
lenders to add ancillary products and services to the payday lending products.
That practice allows the lenders to avoid statutory limits on fees.
For example, payday lenders in some cases have avoided fee ceilings by
selling insurance with the credit product, enabling the lenders to comply with
rate ceilings while generating revenue through products that most consumers
probably do not want.225 Another similar practice is to force consumers to
purchase advertising space (for sayings such as “Go Cowboys!”) in the lender’s
newsletter226 or to purchase gift certificates for worthless products in catalogs.227
Perhaps more blatantly, lenders simply create new fees and dub them membership fees or service or administrative fees that should not count as part of the

223.
It might at first glance seem odd that a credible regulatory program could rest in large part on
legislation drafted by the interested community, but it seems more sensible if we accept the
premise of the last part of this Article: that reputational and capital market constraints will force the
large national providers to behave differently than small mom-and-pop providers. If the large national
providers can operate more cheaply than the small mom-and-pop providers, they benefit from rules
that firmly sanction shady corner cutting, from which the reputational and capital-market constraints
(by hypothesis) exclude the large national providers.
224.
For a good model provision, see H.R. 5122, 109th Cong. § 670 (2006) (enacted) (detailing
the limitations on terms of consumer credit extended to servicemen and dependents).
225.
For example, Canadian lender Stop N’ Cash used this practice successfully to avoid
Canada’s 60 percent rate ceiling. Jim Rankin, Payday Lender Wins Insurance Go-Ahead, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 17, 2004, at A20. The practice of adding insurance to loans also seems to be prevalent in
France, allowing lenders to obviate the strict regulation of the APR. DTI REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8.
226.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 20–21.
227.
Moss, supra note 2, at 1729–30.
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interest charged for the transaction.228 Another recent practice is loan splitting,
in which a single loan is split into several checks, presumably to present the
customer with at least a threat of multiple check-bouncing fees upon default.229
A related problem arises whenever the lenders take checks rather than ACH
transfers. It is clear that at least some lenders use possession of checks as a
device to threaten borrowers with the prospect of prosecution for uttering a hot
check.230 However unlikely such a prosecution might be in fact, the threat in at
least some cases might have real bite; it seems unlikely that a lender that used
ACH transfers rather than checks could make such a threat effective.231
For the most part, these practices are tolerated in jurisdictions in which
unreasonably low rate caps otherwise would prevent payday lenders from
operating.232 In our view, however, a sensible regulatory scheme would enact
limits that would allow reputable businesses to operate (as discussed in Part I),
but would restrict the ability of payday lenders to package other products or
fees with that service. The full cost of any goods or services purchased
contemporaneously with the lending transaction would count against the
applicable fee cap and would have to be disclosed as such.233 The purpose is a
simple one. If the product and its pricing can be made as simple as possible—so
228.
Rankin & MacIntyre, supra note 115, at A1 (describing the lending practice in Canada);
WILSON, supra note 46, at 46 (explaining lending practice in Australia); DTI REPORT, supra note 5,
at 7–8 (describing the lending practices in France and Germany). Dollar Financial Corp. admits in
its Annual Report to engaging in this practice in Canada: “A federal usury ceiling applies to loans
we make to Canadian consumers. Such borrowers contract to repay us in cash; if they elect to repay
by check, we also collect, in addition to the maximum permissible finance charge, our customary check-cashing
fees.” Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 18–19 (emphasis added).
229.
See Press Release, Wash. State Dep’t of Fin. Inst., State Files Largest Case Against Payday
Lender (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumers/news/2006/check_n_go.htm.
230.
See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 488 (2005).
231.
Interestingly, the large national providers to whom we have spoken generally prefer ACH
transfers, because the transaction costs of processing them are lower than the transaction costs of processing
checks. Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors). They also scoffed at the idea
that they could profit by repeatedly depositing checks or by running repeated ACH entries against the
customer’s account. In their view, only the uninformed would view that as a useful threat. Although it
would expose the customer to repeated charges from its depositary bank, it would harm the chances that
the payday lender would collect in two ways. First, because the depositary bank would charge the
fees directly against the customer’s account (something the payday lender cannot do), the charges
would deplete funds available to the customer to repay the loan voluntarily. Secondly, the activity would
motivate the customer not to repay the loan. Because (in the view of these sources) the collection
remedies of payday lenders are so limited, their main chance of collection from a borrower in distress is
by fostering a good relation with the borrower. Antagonistic collection techniques, in their view, are
distinctly counterproductive. Id. It is difficult to assess how widely those views are shared (or practiced).
232.
Scholars often remark on how payday lenders continue to restructure themselves to avoid
regulation. See Barr, supra note 2, at 158–60 (explaining how lenders expend resources to avoid low
caps by creating inefficient rent-a-charter relationships); WILSON, supra note 46, at 46 (describing
Australian lending practices); RAMSAY, supra note 46, at 5 (describing lending practices in Canada).
233.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.2160 (West Supp. 2006).
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that there is a single fee234—it increases the likelihood that borrowers accurately
will understand (and compare) the cost of borrowing.235
b.

Disclosure

Requiring parties to disclose information is a common form of consumerprotection regulation.236 In this context, as discussed above, the Truth in Lending
Act,237 like similar regulations in countries such as Australia238 and Canada,239
240
imposes a uniform interest-rate disclosure obligation on payday lenders.
Regardless of the merits of such regulation, several aspects of the payday
lending industry make the current mandatory disclosures counterproductive.
The most basic problem is that TILA communicates the wrong information to
borrowers: the annual percentage rate. While the APR may provide a good
comparison mechanism for loans generally,241 studies suggest that requiring APR
disclosures on payday loans is ineffective.242 An Australian survey found that
234.
To be sure, this recommendation leaves unsolved the problem of overdraft fees assessed by
the customer’s bank when payday lenders unsuccessfully attempt to collect checks from their customers.
Our vision of a single fee is undermined if the banks at which defaulting borrowers have their
accounts impose substantial overdraft fees when the checks that they have given their payday lenders
bounce. Because those banks are not a party to the lending transaction, however, it is harder to justify
regulating the fees that they can charge; these bounced checks, after all, are not all that different from
any other bounced checks issued by their customers.
235.
We are skeptical of Chris Robinson’s proposal for Canada that rates be determined either
by a fixed rate per amount borrowed (plus a set per loan fee and an interest rate), or by different fees
for different amounts borrowed (for example, 12 percent for the first $250 borrowed and 6 percent for
everything higher than that amount). See Daw, supra note 26, at D6. Even if this scheme works under
finance theory, we worry that the average borrower would find it difficult to understand these more
complex pricing schemes.
236.
See MANN, supra note 140, ch. 13.
237.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693 (2000).
238.
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 2001, §§ 14–15 (Austl.) (governing contracts); id. § 143
(governing advertisements).
239.
E.g., Manitoba Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M., ch. C200, § 4(3) (1987); Newfoundland
and Labrador Consumer Protection Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. C-31, § 16 (1990); Nunavut Consumer
Protection Act, R.S.N.W.T., ch. C-17, § 5 (1988); Prince Edward Island Consumer Protection Act,
R.S.P.E.I., ch. C-19, § 16 (1988); Yukon Consumer Protection Act, S.Y.T., ch. 40, § 5 (2002).
240.
15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2000).
241.
See Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1593 (arguing that APRs are important tools).
242.
Graves and Peterson argue the opposite. They claim that APRs are appropriate because
(1) many borrowers roll over loans, so payday loans “often compound for durations coming close to or
exceeding a year”; (2) “annualized interest rates [for loans] are the uniform metric which all
mainstream creditors use to compare prices”; and (3) borrowers would confuse loan prices quoted “as
a percent of the principal borrowed” with APRs from other products. Graves & Peterson, supra note 15,
at 662–63. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. Studies do not suggest that rollover loans typically
extend for a year. At most, Graves and Peterson’s research established that some borrowers rolled
over loans 12.5 times—less than half of a year in the worst scenario. Id. at 663. Also, even if APRs
were useful in mainstream credit (which we doubt), that does not tell us how we should disclose
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78 percent of Australians measured the cost of their payday loans in a dollar
amount, not in an interest rate,243 suggesting that people do not think of payday
loans in terms of an abstract rate but rather a concrete cost. Evidence from the
United States backs up this claim; previous scholars have found that although
most people do not understand APR disclosures,244 they do understand the
finance charge, which is a dollar amount.245
Interest-rate disclosures are misleading because the amount of the fee
charged generally does not depend on the number of days until the borrower’s
payday.246 An interest-rate disclosure would suggest that the rate changes every
day depending on which day in the pay cycle the borrower obtains the loan,
when actually the cost is uniform throughout that cycle. This confusion does
nothing to help consumers evaluate competing products.
The current regulatory scheme is also problematic because consumers
often get the information too late in the process for it to be useful.247 Most
courts merely require that the lender provide the required disclosure sometime
before the contract is signed, but consumers have no opportunity to comparison
shop if they receive the disclosure immediately before the deal is done.248 The
model act supported by CFSA follows this same pattern. Lenders must disclose
the APR, but only when the customer signs the contract—not before, when
the customer might still be interested in price comparisons.249 A sensible scheme
would require that the basic fee be prominently posted so that consumers
could compare the fees available from different providers without incurring
substantial transaction costs.
Finally, there is, at least presently, a substantial problem of noncompliance. A study of payday lenders in Ohio suggests that 68 percent of payday
pricing information to people using fringe products. It is essential to evaluate the specific credit
mechanism in question. As Sunstein observes, “[b]ecause of bounded rationality, some frames will
have more of an impact than others. For those who suffer from serious forms of bounded rationality,
steps like those in the Truth in Lending Act may well do little good.” Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly
Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 261 (2006). Finally, annualized interest rates are not
the uniform-pricing guide in short-term lending: Overdraft fees from banks—a major competitor for
payday loans—are not expressed in terms of APR but in simple dollar amounts.
243.
WILSON, supra note 46, at 77.
244.
Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1591–92.
245.
Id. at 1593.
246.
Cf., e.g., ACE Cash Express, Inc., supra note 20, at 3 (reporting that loans are made “until
the customer’s next payday”); Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., supra note 40, at 4 (“These cash advance loans
generally have a loan term of 7 to 45 days and are generally payable on the customer’s next payday.”);
Ten Dollar Payday Loan.com’s payment schedule, TenDollarPaydayLoan.com, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.tendollarpaydayloan.com/faqs.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
247.
Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1590–91.
248.
Bertics, supra note 2, at 148–49.
249.
Model Deferred Deposit Act, supra note 79, § 3 at 35.
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lenders either failed to disclose interest rates or disclosed them inaccurately.250
In part, a simple desire to hinder competition may be the cause,251 but it is
also surely attributable in part to the mismatched disclosure scheme that
requires lenders to advertise rates in terms that seem absurdly high even for
relatively mainstream products.252
The best solution, from our perspective, is to adopt a simple disclosure
scheme, with which reputable lenders readily can comply. We would require
lenders to display in a prominent way the fee per $100 borrowed. This disclosure requirement solves the problems identified above: It (1) tracks with the
survey data that customers use their actual cost to make decisions and not an
interest percentage;253 (2) eliminates the confusion caused by different interest
rates for different time periods; (3) ensures borrowers obtain the information up
front at little cost; and (4) encourages compliance by allowing lenders to avoid
stating misleadingly high APRs.
2.

Indirect Reforms: Fostering a Better Class of Lenders

The preceding Subpart discusses ways to enhance the transparency of the
payday lending market, hoping to foster some competition through the provision of simple and accessible information. The central point of our proposal,
however, is to draw a line between mainstream payday lending transactions, which
are to be tolerated, and extramarket, abusive transactions, which are to be
pursued and sanctioned aggressively.
Our proposal for fencing off abusive transactions has two parts. The first is
the simplest: drawing a line between the mainstream payday lending market
and the abuses that involve fees not justified by ordinary costs and competitive
pressures. The landscape of U.S. regulation makes it clear that states can see
the difference between regulatory systems that involve fee caps that close off
250.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 46.
251.
See id. at 25.
252.
See Hellwig, supra note 2, at 1597; Johnson, supra note 2, at 25. Canadian payday lenders
have also balked at disclosing APRs. Canadian Ass’n of Cmty. Fin. Serv. Providers, Payday Loan
Association Supports Consumer Protection Legislation and Consumers’ Right to Full Disclosure, July 29,
2005, http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CNW/20050729/1307295753 (“‘The
Ontario Government has asked all lenders in the province to disclose an annual cost of borrowing,
even if a loan is taken out for only a few days. While this is like asking hotels to disclose a daily room
rate of $200 as an annualized figure of $73,000, we are advising association members to respect the
law and disclose accordingly,’ says [Bob] Whitelaw.”).
253.
A glance at the websites of Internet payday loan providers suggests both that this is a piece of
information that consumers generally find valuable and, less happily, that providers with high rates have
a penchant for shrouding this figure rather than blazoning it upon their home screen (or, as with
tendollarpaydayloan.com, incorporating it into their domain name).
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the market for reputable payday lending and those with realistic fee caps and
usury ceilings that will permit profitable activity by reputable lenders. If we are
right that mom-and-pop lenders are both less efficient than the national
providers and also more likely to engage in abusive behavior (as both common
sense and our interviews indicate254), a fee cap in the range of $15 to $20 could
be quite beneficial, because it might force many of the mom-and-pop lenders
from the market.255 This would be particularly true if the cap were combined
with an effective disclosure regime like the one discussed above.
The second part of our proposal is more difficult: encouraging participation in the market by large and reputable lenders. Although regulators and
consumer activists for the most part have decried efforts by large financial
institutions to move into this market,256 we urge exactly the opposite approach.
If this market is left largely unregulated, then numerous benefits flow from
having the actors in the market include the largest and most reputable
institutions.257 It may be that such an environment will lead to participation in
258
the market by large banks that currently refrain from participating. However,
254.
Interviews with Anonymous (spring 2006) (on file with authors).
255.
Michael Barr has pointed out to us that mom-and-pop providers strongly opposed the
Michigan statute discussed above because they did not believe they could operate profitably at a rate of
$20 per $100. Interview with Michael Barr (spring 2006) (on file with authors). Recently, Chris
Robinson, a Canadian finance professor, has proposed a similar cap on payday fees so severe that smaller
payday lenders would be driven out of business and replaced by large chains and mainstream financial
institutions. Daw, supra note 26, at D6.
256.
Some commentary explicitly condemns the involvement of publicly held companies in
payday lending because such companies allow upper- and middle-income people to profit from
making unreasonable loans to the poor. RAMSAY, supra note 46, at 4; Michael Hudson, Introduction
to MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 2, 2 (Michael
Hudson ed., 1996) (“There’s another place you can run across the poverty industry these days: Try
the stock pages of your newspaper. More and more, the merchants who profit from the disadvantaged
are owned or bankrolled by the big names of Wall Street . . . .”). Publicly held banks like JPMorgan
Chase already finance payday lenders, so public companies already participate in payday lending. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text. Our suggestion is that they do so directly.
257.
Wells Fargo’s participation as a payday lender suggests that this argument is more than just
theoretical. Wells Fargo’s payday product implements many of the microlevel suggestions we made
above: The finance charge is stated in a clear dollar amount ($2 for every $20 borrowed), the payment is
withdrawn automatically from the borrower’s checking account, and rollovers are limited (a borrower
can only obtain twelve consecutive advances before being forced to wait a month). Wells Fargo,
Direct Deposit Advance Source Agreement—Terms and Conditions, https://www.wellsfargo.com/wf/
checking/dda/terms (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Wells Fargo also permits borrowers to borrow only
half of the amount of the direct deposit, making repayment more likely. Id. It is not clear that this
product complies with Electronic Fund Transfer (EFTA) Act § 913, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2006), because
it appears to condition the advance on a right to collect by a preauthorized funds transfer. Perhaps
Wells Fargo could have designed the product as an “overdraft credit plan” exempt from EFTA
coverage, see 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(e)(1) (2006), but the actual product description does not provide
any support for that treatment.
258.
Bertics, supra note 2, at 143–44.
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as the Bair Report suggests, there is some reason to think that those institutions
will never be as competitive in this market as entities more focused on payday
lending and associated check-cashing services.259 It also is true that banking
regulators might have justifiable concerns about their ability to monitor the
kind of low-document, high-volume lending involved here. Our goal, however,
is to remove artificial barriers to entry, so that the lenders best placed to operate
in this market can enter it without reputational or unjustified regulatory
sanction. If the most effective financial structure for this industry involves direct
participation by large financial institutions, we think that regulators should
consider that premise when designing regulatory schemes.260 In our view, the
rapid spread of the product and the profitability of the industry suggests that regulators need do little to induce participation by large, well-capitalized companies.
The most obvious benefit of participation by large institutions is that they
have much more to lose from noncompliance.261 It also is much easier to monitor
a small number of large chains than to monitor thousands of separately operated
providers. In addition, large institutions that fail to develop policies that ensure
compliance with regulations can be forced to pay extremely large fines, in an
amount adequate to deter misconduct.262
Large publicly traded companies also must fear the adverse effects on their
market capitalization that are likely to ensue if they engage in behavior that is
portrayed as unpalatable or illegal in the mass media. We have seen this
already. For example, when the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the FDIC prohibited payday lenders from partnering with national
banks to avoid unfavorable interest-rate caps, the stock price of several publicly

259.
See supra notes 161–167 and accompanying text.
260.
Michael Barr is the most creative and articulate proponent, emphasizing the cost effectiveness
of direct-debit collection by banks as well as the benefits to borrowers of a short-term lending product
that would amortize rather than remain at a fixed balance. Barr, supra note 2, at 163–64. It is unclear
whether such a product can be made profitable. Moreover, as discussed above, see supra note 257,
the product might not comply with EFTA § 913. The best answer to that problem, however, surely
would be to amend EFTA § 913 to permit the products in question.
261.
This echoes Michael Barr’s point that fines against large entities are more meaningful
because they are more likely to have the capital to pay them. Michael Barr, Access to Financial Services
in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2002); see also Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment
Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681 (2004). For a related discussion of why banks are less prone to
aggressive lending than their nondepository agents, see Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency
Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They
Can Chew? 25–29 (Univ. of Fla., Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=932698.
262.
This assumes, of course, that the relevant regulators are willing to focus their attention on
issues of consumer protection, whereas so often in the past they have been concerned solely with capital
adequacy and financial stability. The shift of authority to state regulators discussed in the Introduction
and Part I offers good reason to think that regulators, at least in some states, will focus on these questions.
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held payday lenders dropped 10 percent or more.263 Similarly, after the corporate
scandals of the last few years, the officers of large entities realistically will fear
substantial criminal penalties if they allow their businesses to operate in a way
that does not reflect a serious effort to comply with applicable regulations.
Prosecutions of larger entities are also much more useful as a regulatory
matter. If the government finds a sole payday lending store violating a
regulation, the importance of a prosecution is minimal—it only affects the small
number of transactions at that store. In contrast, if a large entity violates
regulations in all of its stores across the country, prosecutors have the opportunity to affect the many transactions at all of these stores by prosecuting that
one entity. In addition, if the number of potential violators is smaller—that is, if
a small number of entities offer all the payday loans in the United States in
contrast to the large number of small payday lenders currently offering loans, the
government will be able to pursue a larger percentage of the violators.
Further, prosecuting large companies would have a greater deterrent
effect on other payday lenders than prosecuting small payday lenders.
Deterrence is a function of the actor’s perception of the severity of the punishment and the likelihood of being prosecuted. Prosecutions of large companies
receive publicity, and publicizing prosecutions makes would-be violators
think that the risk of being prosecuted is greater.
Another noted benefit in enforcing compliance with large companies is
that it is much easier for regulators to monitor the activities of a small number
of relatively large companies than it is to monitor the activities of a large
number of small and evanescent competitors. Aside from the simple economies
of scale, publicly traded companies are more likely to have detailed data about
their operations. Furthermore, the data is more likely to be reliable than it is for
smaller companies that are unlikely to rely on independent auditors. All in all,
the emergence of large-scale entities into the market would ease the task of the
supervisory regulator.
A market composed of large actors also solves some of the problems with
civil enforcement noted at the beginning of Part II.C. Because the policies of
large entities often would be uniform across a large number of transactions, class
actions would be a more viable mechanism for pursuing actions challenging
abusive practices.

263.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 20 n.31. Our primary argument is not that large
payday lenders worry that the public might think their conduct is unsavory, but rather that these
large providers worry that the public might consider their conduct illegal, so that investors would not
consider them strong investments. Yet, to the extent that publicly held companies account for ethical
investors in setting policies, encouraging large providers may curb unsavory lending practices.
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Although it is harder to be sure, there also is some reason to think that
entry into the market by larger and better-capitalized companies ultimately could
lead to better products and prices for the customers in the market.264 The
most obvious reason for this is that high-quality payday lending, like other
developed forms of lending, is a business that depends heavily on sophisticated
information technology and standardized operations for which there are
substantial economies of scale.265 What little empirical evidence we have
266
seen suggests that this is a serious issue.
To see how this works, consider the annual report of Cash America
International, Inc., one of the largest payday lenders in the United States.267
This firm has grown steadily through acquisitions in the past few years, using
a simple model in which it takes over a promising location and then rapidly
improves the profitability of the location through installation of the company’s
centralized management and standardized operations.268 Other large payday
lenders also boast that their proprietary computer information systems and pointof-sale technology are pivotal components that increase their stores’ productivity
and allow them to effectively expand through acquisitions.269
264.
See Samuel Hanson & Donald P. Morgan, Predatory Lending? (May 4, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (concluding through empirical analysis that payday lending rates are
significantly lower in jurisdictions with a greater number of lenders per capita).
265.
See Barr, supra note 2, at 157–58 (making a similar argument about consolidation).
266.
See Morgan Stanley Equity Research, supra note 63, at 16 exhibit 10 (using data from several
large chains to illustrate correlation between costs of operation and size of chain).
267.
Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., supra note 40, at 1.
268.
Id. (“The Company’s growth over the years has been the result of its business strategy of
acquiring existing pawnshop locations and establishing new pawnshop locations that can benefit
from the Company’s centralized management and standardized operations. In 2003, the Company
expanded this strategy to include acquiring existing cash advance locations and establishing new cash
advance locations.”). See also, Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 6 (noting that “our centralized support
centers [are] a competitive advantage”).
269.
First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., supra note 12, at 3 (“The Company utilizes a proprietary
computer information system that provides fully integrated functionality to support point-of-sale retail
operations, inventory management and loan processing. Each store is connected on a real-time basis
to a secured off-site data center . . . .”). See also ACE Cash Express, Inc., supra note 20, at 5 (“To
better service our customers and manage our stores in the most profitable manner, we have developed
proprietary information systems, including a point-of-sale system and a management information
system, designed for the efficient delivery of our financial services with the proper balance of corporate
management. Our in-house information systems team has built a reliable and scalable technology
infrastructure that will allow us to grow our business without significant additional capital expenditures. . . . By implementing our Operational Goals and information systems, we are typically able to
increase revenue and gross margin in our acquired stores and to enhance the acquired stores’
service offerings.”); Dollar Fin. Corp., supra note 42, at 6 (“Our proprietary systems are used to further
improve our customer relations and loan servicing activities, as well as to provide a highly efficient
means to manage our internal as well as regulatory compliance efforts.”); id. at 16 (“The point-of-sale
system, together with the enhanced loan-management and collections systems, has improved our
ability to offer new products and services and our customer service.”).
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The problems for smaller companies are easier to see. Smaller companies
are less likely than the larger players to have ready access to credit services, such
as TeleTrack, to determine if applicants have other outstanding payday loans or
credit problems.270 Smaller companies are less likely to have specialized central
271
Indeed,
processing, which seems to be highly efficient in this industry.
because the larger companies for the most part are companies that have other
products (check-cashing services being the most common), the ability to
spread administrative costs over more locations and products seems to be quite
important. For example, Ernst & Young’s study of Canadian payday lenders
confirms that lenders with different types of products and not just payday loans
had significantly lower costs per $100 of payday loans.272 In the end, the data
we have about the industry—principally from the FDIC study (in this country)
and the Ernst & Young study (in Canada)—strongly suggest that economies of
scale give the larger lenders lower costs of doing business, and thus higher
profitability.273
One last consideration relates to the way that payday loan transactions
interact with the credit-reporting system. Because payday lenders do not
report positive transactional data to the three large consumer-reporting
agencies, there is a concern that the payday borrowers will not form credit
histories that would facilitate mainstream borrowing.274 This issue gained
prominence with the passage of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions
Act of 2003 (FACT Act). Section 312 of the FACT Act requires the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and federal banking agencies to prescribe
guidelines to ensure the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to
consumer-reporting agencies (CRAs).275 Section 318 requires the FTC to conduct
an ongoing study of the accuracy and completeness of consumer-credit
reports and to report on four specific topics related to credit-report accuracy,
including—of relevance here—whether there are any common financial

270.
Barr, supra note 2, at 151.
271.
See Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 11 (describing such costs for payday lenders).
272.
E&Y CANADA STUDY, supra note 26, at 34.
273.
Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 9, at 2; E&Y CANADA STUDY, supra note 26, at 46.
274.
Academics have noted this problem. See Barr, supra note 2, at 124; see also Brooks, supra
note 2, at 997.
275.
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
[hereinafter FACT Act]. As part of that process, these agencies have solicited comments on the types of
errors, omissions and other problems that may impair the accuracy and integrity of information provided
to consumer-reporting agencies, including the omission of “potentially significant information about
the consumer account or transaction, such as credit limits for or positive information about the
account.” Federal Trade Commission, Interagency Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 Fed.
Reg. 14,419 (Mar. 22, 2006) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 660-61).
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transactions not generally reported to the CRAs that would provide useful
information in determining a consumer’s credit rating.276
The first interim report emphasized that information related to utilities
and rent payments would be most likely to address the problem of “thin” credit
reports; the report mentions payday lending in passing, but does not suggest
that the information would be sufficiently predictive of creditworthiness to make
its omission a matter of concern.277 This makes sense, given the limited
information about creditworthiness to be gained from a pattern of payday
borrowing and repayment. Still, a requirement to report information to the
CRAs would advantage the large national providers, because their access to
information technology allows them to comply at lower costs.
The real problem is that the market for consumer borrowing currently falls
into two starkly different sectors: (1) credit card borrowing and unsecured bank
lending, both of which operate with interest rates in the range of 15 to 30
percent; and (2) payday lending, which operates with interest rates in the range
of 400 to 500 percent. There is little reason to think that the risk profiles of
borrowers justify the rate discontinuity between these sectors. Rather, the
distinction is that the borrowers whose needs cannot be met with the highly
specialized products offered by banks in the 15 to 30 percent range are lumped
into a single category in which the principal criterion that currently is evaluated
is the possession of a few recent pay stubs, with a single (high) rate charged to
all in the category.
The challenge is to encourage some lenders to offer products that fill that
large gap. The existing initiatives all have started with mainstream lenders
offering products with prices slightly higher than their existing mainstream
products, but targeting them at the very risky pool that presently purchases the
high-priced payday lending product. The problem with that approach is that it
involves lenders that are unfamiliar with both the customer base and the
products that are attractive to that base attempting to design products that will
be safe and desirable to those customers. That is not an impossible task, but it
is an ambitious one.
History suggests that a more fruitful approach would be to start with the
entities that already know the customers and what they want. In an ideal world,
competition among sophisticated entities could force the providers of the very
expensive product to develop ways to carve out less risky segments of their

276.
FACT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952.
277.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 319 OF THE FAIR
AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTION ACT OF 2003, at 80–82 (Dec. 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/Facta/041209factarpt.pdf.
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customer pool, charging them ever lower prices. In the credit card industry in
the last two decades, this approach has resulted in a highly segmented array of
interest rates, which includes a marked lowering of interest rates for customers
that are relatively creditworthy. There is every reason to think that the same
advances that information technology has brought to the credit card industry
in this country could be useful in the payday lending industry as well. Thus,
our hope is that a set of large, profit-oriented entities, with free rein to deploy
information technology to learn more about characteristics of their customers
that relate to the likelihood that they will be profitable, could help advance
the payday industry.

CONCLUSION
Payday lending regulation should respond to the problems that require
intervention. In that vein, we pursued three goals in this Article. First, we
looked at the facts. By engaging empirical studies and the annual reports from
the leading businesses in the industry, we were able to provide a balanced
description of the business and economics of payday lending and its alternatives.
Although existing empirical research fails to answer many of the important
questions, it does allow us to provide some insight into why consumers rationally
might prefer the product to its alternatives and how businesses can profit
from lending to those consumers. Our balanced approach also allows us to
recommend more pointed inquiries for future empirical research.
Second, we tried to provide more careful analysis of the regulatory alternatives than the existing scholarship. If legislators can be encouraged to think
clearly about the alternatives before them and choose regimes that have the
potential to accomplish their policy goals, legislation that is unenforced or
ineffective on its face would be less common.
Finally, and most importantly, we provided grounds for counteracting the
existing hostility to an active role in this market for large publicly traded
providers. If this market is to be tolerated, the market should be populated by
large companies motivated by the reputational constraints that attend
participation in the public finance markets, not the fly-by-night operators that
are so common today.

